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Articles
TESSIE HUTCHINSON AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
EARL F. MARTIN*
INTRODUCTION
Tessie Hutchinson was in the middle of a cleared space by now, and
she held her hands out desperately as the villagers moved in on her.
"It isn't fair," she said. A stone hit her on the side of the head.
Old Man Warner was saying, "Come on, come on, everyone." Steve
Adams was in the front of the crowd of villagers, with Mrs. Graves
beside him.
"It isn't fair, it isn't right." Mrs. Hutchinson screamed, and then
they were upon her.1
If you are not familiar with Shirley Jackson's harrowing short
story, The Lottery, you are undoubtedly wondering what Tessie
Hutchinson did to command her fate. On the other hand, if you
know the story you understand that Mrs. Hutchinson's only sin was to
live in a village that celebrated the 27th of June each year with a com-
munal stoning of one of its inhabitants. In either case, as one reader
put it shortly after the story's debut in the June 26, 1948 issue of The
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. J.D., Univer-
sity of Kentucky; LL.M., Yale Law School. The author would like to thank Professors Ste-
phen Alton, Eric Muller, and Richard Storrow, and Dr. Brackette Williams for their helpful
comments and suggestions, and Shannon Pritchard and Sherry Whelchel for their valuable
research assistance.
1. Shirley Jackson, The Lottery, in FIFIY YEARS OF THE AMERICAN SHORT STORY 390, at
397 (William Abrahams ed., 1970). For on-line access to this story go to <http://new-
ark.rutgers. edu/-lcrew/lottery.html>.
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New Yorker, the mental image the passage evokes has the power to
make one "want to put [one's] head under water and end it all."2
Notwithstanding any gnawing sensation that may linger after
reading The Lottery, we can take comfort in the fact that it is fiction
after all, far removed from the realities of our existence. Or is it?
While the process that condemned Tessie Hutchinson to die is worlds
apart from what goes on in American courtrooms wherein the fate of
capital defendants is decided, there are troubling parallels between
Ms. Jackson's story and our American system of capital punishment.3
In fact, it is far too easy to draw comparisons between the events of
June 27th in Ms. Jackson's fictional village and how we4 send a se-
lected few of our fellow citizens to their death.
In the pages that follow I will suggest some ways that the life of
our death penalty mirrors the art of The Lottery. Specifically, in order
of appearance, I will share comments on the masking of evil, the exe-
cution of the innocent, the arbitrariness in selecting those who die,
the search for justification, and the brutality of the death penalty. Al-
though Ms. Jackson's story is not the perfect mirror for all of the
problems that plague America's system of capital punishment, on
these five issues her disturbing tale offers insight into the practice of
killing our own.
I. MASKING THE EVIL
There was a great deal of fussing to be done before Mr. Summers
declared the lottery open. There were the lists to make up-of heads of
2. JUDY OPPENHEIMER, PRIVATE DEMONS: THE LIFE OF SHIRLEYJACKSON 131 (1988) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). A number of other readers had a different reaction to
the story. Some wrote to Ms. Jackson to find out where the lotteries were being held so
that they could go watch. See id. at 129 (noting that some readers wanted to know if The
Lottery described "a current custom" while others inquired as to "the locale and the year of
the custom").
3. See generally LENEMAJA FRIEDMAN, SHIRLEYJACKSON 67 (1975) (concluding that "the
lottery may be symbolic of any of a number of social ills that mankind blindly
perpetrates").
4. The actions of our state and federal governments are ultimately our own. As
De Tocqueville explained:
In America... direction really comes from the people, and though the form of
government is representative, it is clear that the opinions, prejudices, interests,
and even passions of the people can find no lasting obstacles preventing them
from being manifest in the daily conduct of society.
In the United States, as in all countries where the people reign, the majority
rules in the name of the people.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 159 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds.,
George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835). Alexis de Tocqueville's writings can
be viewed on-line at <http://xroads.virginia.edu/2hvper/detoc/home.html>.
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families, heads of households in each family, members of each house-
hold in each family. There was the proper swearing-in of Mr.
Summers by the postmaster, as the official of the lottery; at one time,
some people remembered, there had been a recital of some sort, per-
formed by the official of the lottery, a perfunctory, tuneless chant that
had been rattled off duly each year; some people believed that the
official of the lottery used to stand just so when he said or sang it,
others believed that he was supposed to walk among the people, but
years and years ago this part of the ritual had been allowed to lapse.
There had been, also, a ritual salute, which the official of the lottery
had had to use in addressing each person who came up to draw from
the box, but this also had changed with time, until now it was felt
necessary only for the official to speak to each person approaching.
Mr. Summers was very good at all this; in his clean white shirt and
blue jeans, with one hand resting carelessly on the black box, he
seemed very proper and important as he talked interminably to Mr.
Graves and the Martins.'
The most intriguing and brilliant aspect of Ms. Jackson's story is
that even the most attentive reader can fail to see the evil that is un-
folding on the page until well into the story, or even until its very end.
This was a phenomenon that was well known to Ms. Jackson as evi-
denced by her comment after publication that "[the number of
people who expected Mrs. Hutchinson to win a Bendix washer at the
end would amaze you."6 At least part of the explanation for this is
that Ms. Jackson artfully hides the evil behind the bureaucratic nice-
ties of the process. Ms. Jackson gives us Mr. Summers, the story's
agent of death, fussing with lists and exchanging pleasantries with
those around him.7 Later, just before the drawing commences, Mr.
Summers formally questions Janey Dunbar about the need for her to
draw for her household, notwithstanding that we are told that Mr.
Summers and everyone in the village knew the answer "perfectly
well."' Thereafter, once the lottery is underway, Mr. Summers, ever
5. Jackson, supra note 1, at 392.
6. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 2, at 131 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Jackson in a letter she wrote to a newspaper columnist).
7. Jackson, supra note 1, at 391-92 (describing Mr. Summers "as the official of the
lottery").
8. Id. at 393. What it is that everyone in the village knew "perfectly well" is not clear.
Is it that everyone knows that Mr. Dunbar is laid up at home with a broken leg and the
eldest Dunbar son is not of age to select for his family, as the story suggests? Or is it, as has
been proposed elsewhere, that there used to be an older son, but he fell victim to the
lottery in a previous year? See Helen E. Nebeker, "The Lottery": Symbolic Tour de Force, 46 AM.
LITERATURE 100, 104-05 (1974) (hypothesizing that Mr. Dunbar may have deliberately bro-
ken his own leg to avoid the painful experience of attending the ritual at which his son was
previously killed).
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the good civic leader,9 makes a point of greeting each person as they
draw their lot, and very publicly calls out his own name at the appro-
priate time and steps forward precisely to select his slip from the
box. 10
Even before Tessie Hutchinson is reduced to begging all of those
with whom she has shared her life not to stone her to death, there are
clues that all is not well in the village. In the second and third
paragraphs of the story, Ms. Jackson calls attention to the reaction of
the gathering men to a pile of stones," hinting that something is
amiss." Further into the story, the reader is offered glimpses of the
unease that the lottery seems to cast over many of the villagers;13 an
unease that is inconsistent with the opportunity to win a new washing
machine. In the end, once the picture is painted all too clearly, the
reader learns a lesson about the banality of evil, and it is this same
lesson that can also be taken from our system of capital punishment.
In many ways, the ultimate fact of the death penalty-that we are
killing our fellow human beings-is hidden by the process that sur-
rounds the event. The most obvious example of this is that executions
take place behind prison walls and locked doors, so that we do not
have to bear witness to the spectacle.14 Removing executions from the
public view creates the tendency for the sanction to fall into the "out
of sight, out of mind" category of events, 5 which encourages us to
avoid confronting the moral consequences of our actions.1 6
9. SeeJackson, supra note 1, at 391 (describing Mr. Summers as a man "who has time
and energy to devote to civic activities" such as square dances, the teenage club, and the
lottery).
10. See id. at 393-96.
11. SeeJackson, supra note 1, at 397 ("Soon the men began to gather surveying their
own children, speaking of planting and rain, tractors and taxes. They stood together, away
from the pile of stones in the corner, and their jokes were quiet and they smiled rather
than laughed.").
12. Cf Nebeker, supra note 8, at 102 ("By the end of just two paragraphs, Jackson has
carefully indicated the [summer] season, time of ancient excess and sacrifice, and the
stones, most ancient of sacrificial weapons.").
13. For example, as the men of the village waited for everyone to draw for the lottery,
they held their lottery slips in their hands, "turning them over and over nervously." Jackson,
supra note 1, at 394 (emphasis added).
14. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 13 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982) (ex-
plaining that the last public execution in the United States took place in Galena, Missouri,
on May 21, 1937).
15. See Thomas W. Laqueur, Crowds, Carnival and the State in English Executions, 1604-
1868, in THE FiRsT MODERN SOCIETY 305, 355 (A.L. Beier et al. eds., 1989) ("As execution
becomes ever more private and untheatrical it becomes ever more irrelevant.").
16. See Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and
the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1447, 1477 (1997) (noting that, in general,
both the public and capital jurors are "systematically misinformed about many... [death
[VOL. 59:553
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Although the veil of exclusion that surrounds individual execu-
tions may be the most obvious masking effort of the American system
of capital punishment, it is not the only one. There are other means
by which we hide the full impact of the death penalty from ourselves
in an effort to salve our collective conscience. Two of the most signifi-
cant efforts are the bureaucratization of executions and the inclusion
of the learned professions (i.e., lawyers, medical doctors, and the
clergy) throughout the system.
In carrying out a modern day execution, very little is left to
chance by the bureaucrats in charge. Every step of the effort is man-
aged and every participant's role is scripted; with the result being that
personal responsibility is minimized throughout the process. 17 For ex-
ample, in Washington State there is a manual that details exactly what
kind of rope is to be used and how it is to be prepared for those con-
demned men'" who chose hanging over lethal injection." An ex-war-
den of the Mississippi State Penitentiary has described how green clip-
on cards were issued to execution team members while official wit-
nesses got yellow cards,2" and how his staff practiced upcoming execu-
tions, complete with a stand-in that would be strapped into the gas
chamber chair and hooked-up to an EKG monitor.2" In Texas, the
bureaucratic death ritual takes over about two weeks before the execu-
penalty] issues and kept from confronting the truth about the lethal process that proceeds
in their name"). Professor Haney further contends that "the modern state carefully regu-
lates the private nature of the execution ritual to ensure that its citizens learn just enough
(but not too much) about it." Id. at 1478.
17. See ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS
50 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining that the "point of the modern execution procedure is to
suppress any real-life human reactions on the part of the prisoners or their executioners"
and noting that "displays of character or faith-would interfere with the efficient adminis-
tration of the death penalty and indeed draw unwanted attention to the violence of the
proceedings").
18. The masculine noun is used here and throughout this Article due to the fact that
the overwhelming majority of persons who have been executed in the United States have
been males. See KEITH HARRIES & DERRAL CHEATWOOD, THE GEOGRAPHY OF EXECUTION:
THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT QUAGMIRE IN AMERICA 18 (1997) (noting that 97.4% of the
13,329 persons executed between 1786 and 1985 were male).
19. See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 683 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Under the Washington
protocol, the rope must be between three-quarters and one-and-one-quarter inches in di-
ameter. The rope is boiled and then stretched to eliminate most of its elasticity. The rope
is then coated with wax or oil so that it will slide easily." (internal citations omitted)).
20. See DONALD A. CABANA, DEATH AT MIDNIGHT: THE CONFESSION OF AN EXECUTIONER
158 (1996) (describing the planning process for the 1987 execution of Edward Earl
Johnson and noting that people without such cards could not access death row).
21. See id. at 161-63 (noting that the purpose of the practice session was "to make cer-
tain there were no mechanical problems or human errors"). Mississippi has since adopted
lethal injection as its method of execution except for inmates sentenced to death before
July 1, 1984. See Miss CODE ANN. § 99-19-51 (Supp. 1999).
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fion, and covers such items as selecting witnesses for the event, secur-
ing telephone contact with the governor's office, and notifying a
Huntsville funeral home to make arrangements for removal of the
body.22 Depending upon whether the method of execution is by fir-
ing squad or lethal injection, in Utah one member of the execution
team is assured of either firing a blank or releasing a harmless solu-
tion, so that no one knows who actually caused the prisoner's death.2"
The net effect of this bureaucratization of executions is to give
those who carry them out, and the rest of us who receive reports of
the same, a sense of sterility and mundaneness that should never settle
on the state's killing its own.24 It allows everyone within the system,
from the clerk who inventories the condemned prisoner's few worldly
possessions, to the executioner who starts the toxic mix of drugs flow-
ing into the prisoner's veins, to say, "I'm only doing myjob. I'mjust a
cog in the wheel. I didn't kill him."25 Thereafter, when the rest of us
hear what the prisoner had for his last meal or how long he visited
with his family, we are encouraged to take comfort in the belief that
we did not kill him either, rather some omnipotent process did. On
occasion, however, that process is not so omnipotent and executions
do not go according to plan, such as when a prisoner is burned to
death in Florida's electric chair.26 At those times the bureaucratiza-
22. See JAMES W. MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990, 234-40 (1994) (transcribing the Texas Department of
Corrections' post-1974 procedures for executing death-row inmates).
23. SeeJOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 149-50
(1997) (noting that, in Utah, only 4 of the 5 members of a 1977 firing squad shot real
bullets and only 1 of the 2 executioners in a 1992 lethal injection delivered the lethal
drug); see alsoJOHNSON, supra note 17, at 48-49 (recreating the execution protocol for San
Quentin penitentiary in California).
24. See Helen Prejean, Walking Through the Fire, THE OTHER SIDE, September-December
1997, at 49 ("[T]he protocol of an execution is clinical and controlled. Emotions are not
expressed. Witnesses are to be completely silent."). This article can be read on-line at
<http://www.theotherside.org/archive/sep-dec97/prejean.html>. See also JOHNSON, supra
note 17, at 47 (observing that "execution procedures smack of a mechanized, mindless
'nihilism'").
25. See Haney, supra note 16, at 1475 (observing that by dividing the execution process
into discrete, seemingly benign tasks and then repeatedly performing these tasks, execu-
tion team members are allowed "to distance themselves from the final consequences of
their collective, coordinated actions"). See generally Editorial, Texas Death House Massacre,
WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1998, at A30 (offering the following quotes from Texas prison offi-
cials: "we have it down to a science"; "we have the drill down"; and, "when we do it, we do
it right" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26. See Execution Flames Renew Debate, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 26, 1997, at I (describing how
in the Florida execution of Pedro Medina, "there was a small flicker on the right side of the
mask [covering Medina's face] and then orange and blue flames up to a foot long erupted
out of the side and burned for about 10 seconds," filling the witness room with acrid
smoke); see also CABANA, supra note 20, at 10, 167 (describing how in Mississippi's first
[VOL. 59:553
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tion efforts fail, and we are forced to sit up and take notice of what is
happening in our execution chambers,27 just as ShirleyJackson forces
us to sit up and take notice that Tessie Hutchinson is being stoned to
death by her family, friends, and neighbors.
Like the role played in The Lottery by the civic-minded Mr.
Summers in his "clean white shirt and blue jeans,"28 the role of the
learned professions in our system of capital punishment contributes
mightily to the ability of the sanction to hide behind a patina of legiti-
macy. Notwithstanding image problems that plague these professions
from time-to-time, our opinion leaders are very often attorneys, doc-
tors and members of the clergy, and the participation of these men
and women throughout the death penalty chain gives us the peace of
mind that our best and brightest are in charge, so everything must be
okay.
Since our American system of capital punishment at least at-
tempts to be grounded in the rule of law, lawyers are distributed
throughout that system. A large number of the legislators and execu-
tives who champion death penalty statutes are lawyers, and many of
these are not timid about letting the public know that they believe the
death penalty is a necessary and appropriate punishment. 29 Further-
more, all of the judges who preside over death penalty cases at trial
and hear these cases on appeal are lawyers, and in fulfilling these
execution by gas chamber, the lethal mixture was improperly mixed due to human error
and Gerald Gallego did not die until a half hour after the first attempt); MARQUART ET AL.,
supra note 22, at 147 ("In Stephen McCoy's case, on May 24, 1989, the reaction to the
drugs induced a violent choking, gasping and writhing on the gurney-so much so that
one witness fainted."); Michael L. Radelet, Post-Furman Botched Executions (updated by the
Death Penalty Information Center) (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.essential.org/
dpic/botched.html> (cataloging some of the botched executions).
27. Regrettably, these momentary pangs of discomfort either quickly recede or, worse
yet, are offered up as some perverse satisfaction of a job well done. See Execution Flames
Renew Debate, supra note 26, at 1 ("Attorney General Bob Butterworth said Medina's grue-
some end would be a deterrent. 'People who wish to commit murder, they better not do it
in the state of Florida because we may have a problem with our electric chair."').
28. Jackson, supra note 1, at 392.
29. See Stephen B. Bright, The Death Penalty as the Answer to Crime: Costly, Counterproduc-
tive, and Corrupting, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1211, 1212-16 (1995) (discussing politicians'
pro-death penalty rhetoric and the measures some of them have taken to make death a
more frequently imposed punishment); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and
the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 875
B.U. L. REv. 759, 769-76 (1995) (examining how a politician's position on the death pen-
alty has become a litmus test for elected officials at all levels; resulting in a race to claim
responsibility, by way of prosecution or signing a death warrant, for as many executions as
possible); Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1999, at 78 ("Television
advertising in recent election campaigns has often featured candidates trying to persuade
voters that they're 'tougher' with respect to the death penalty than their opponents.").
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functions, these professionals convey to the public that the system is
stable and working properly. In addition to sending this far-reaching
message through their actions and presence, trial and appellate
judges more immediately enable capital sentencing jurors to avoid
confronting the full impact of what it means to condemn another
human being to death.
When trial judges preside over a capital case in accordance with
the accepted legal rules and procedures, they, at least implicitly, con-
vey a message to the jurors that death is the lawfully preferred sanc-
tion and that the jurors should not feel personally responsible for
selecting that result. First, by administering and enforcing the death-
qualifying procedures that are employed in the voir dire of capital
jurors,3 ° trial judges "may seem to convey the message that the legiti-
mate and favored position in the legal system is one supporting ...
[death]."" This message, in turn, may lead capital jurors to believe
they are personally obligated and legally bound to "follow the law" by
choosing capital punishment over the other available alternatives.3 2
Second, by adhering to the dominate restrictive view of what consti-
tutes mitigating evidence,33 trial judges deny the defense the opportu-
nity to impress upon the jurors the full weight of the moral decision
that confronts them.34 By not allowing capital sentencing jurors to
30. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (holding that the proper standard
for excluding ajuror because of his views on capital punishment is whether these views will
"prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as ajuror in accordance with
his instructions and his oath" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980))). It has been argued that this death qualifying standard for capital
juries skews the fairness of the overall process by excluding citizens who oppose capital
punishment. See, e.g., Susan Raedker-Jordan, A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional Con-
struct: The Supreme Court's Evolving Standard of Decency for the Death Penalty, 23 HAsTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 455, 53744 (1996).
31. Haney, supra note 16, at 1482.
32. See id. at 1482-83 (internal quotation marks omitted) (asserting that, during the
jury-selection process, "depending on how death-qualifying questions are posed, they may
seem to imply that the law actually requires jurors to reach death verdicts").
33. See People v. Fudge, 875 P.2d 36, 66 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (concluding that a trial
judge may exclude evidence of how executions are carried out and what life on death row
and in prison without the possibility of parole is like because this evidence does "not aid
the jury in making an individual assessment of the crucial issue whether the death penalty
is appropriate for the particular defendant on trial"); Earl F. Martin, Towards an Evolving
Debate on the Decency of Capital Punishment, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 84, 125-28 (1997)
(describing the current view in the federal courts that mitigation evidence be limited to
information regarding the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his
offense).
34. See Haney, supra note 16, at 1478-79 (observing that by not "requir[ing] capital
jurors to be sensitized to the fact that the defendant may have family, friends, and other
people who care about him and who will also be victimized by his execution[,] . . . [the
system denies jurors] the opportunity to weigh all of the potentially relevant moral consid-
[VOL. 59:553
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hear about the despair and stress of life on death row, the impact that
state-sponsored executions have on the lives of condemned men's
families, and the horrors of the executions themselves, trial judges
prevent jurors from having the information they need to understand
fully and to appreciate the consequences of their decision.3 5 Third,
the confusing and complicated sentencing instructions that are part
of a capital case have a tendency to encourage jurors to see their role
as one of applying a legal formula instead of rendering a moral deci-
sion.3 6 "[T]hese badly framed and poorly understood instructions
seem to provide jurors with a protective shield that enables them to
avoid a sense of personal responsibility for their decisions,"3 " by ratio-
nalizing that their death verdict is "not really ... [their] decision, it's
the law's decision. "38
In addition to contributing to our collective ease towards capital
punishment by providing additional levels of review for death penalty
cases, appellate judges also provide "cover" for capital sentencing ju-
rors when they are required to chose between life and death. Believ-
ing that others up the line will subject their verdict to a searching
review allows jurors to "further distance themselves from the moral
implications of ... [their] awesome responsibility by maintaining the
belief that someone else-typically appellate judges-will ultimately de-
cide the [the defendant's fate].' Paradoxically, "the very judges on
whom capital jurors rely to review and 'correct' their decisions also
defer to and rely on the jury's decision to insulate themselves from the
erations in their decisionmaking"); Martin, supra note 33, at 124-25 ("By allowing a defen-
dant to litigate these matters, jurors would be required to face the full impact of capital
punishment, and thus they would be more prepared to determine if the case warrants such
a severe result."); Austin Sarat, Violence Representation and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The
View from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103, 1124 (1995) (noting that the absence of visual evi-
dence, such as images of the prospective execution site or depictions of the violence of
executions, means that a capital juror is not able "to understand what he [is] being asked
to authorize").
35. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
36. SeeWELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 69 (1987).
37. Haney, supra note 16, at 1484. The most inviting opportunity for capital jurors to
respond in this fashion is when the trial judge, in select jurisdictions, tells the jurors that
their verdict is only a "recommendation" which the judge is free to accept or reject. See
Joseph L. Hoffman, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misperceptions of Sentencing Responsibility in Death
Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1146-48 (1995) (discussing this practice in Indiana and
jurors' responses to "recommendation" instructions).
38. Craig Haney et al., Deciding to Take a Life: Capital Juries, Sentencing Instructions, and
the Jurisprudence of Death, 50J. Soc. ISSUES 149, 166 (1994) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting a capital juror interviewed for the authors' study).
39. Haney, supra note 16, at 1481.
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moral issues posed by death verdicts."4" In the end, though the inter-
play in capital cases between jurors, trial judges, and appellate judges
gives the appearance of a system that squarely faces the gravity of its
task, the diffusion of responsibility between these actors enables them,
and us, to avoid having to experience fully the monumental decision
to kill another human being.4'
At the level of the litigants in a capital case, the prosecutors who
seek and secure the death penalty for defendants, and who frequently
speak publicly in favor of the sanction are all lawyers. Through their
actions and words, these opinion leaders allow us to rest assured that
trusted public officials are in charge and are making sure that only the
"right" defendants are being put at risk of death.42 Additionally, at
trial these attorneys, consistent with the dominant paradigm, 3 em-
ploy legal rules and procedures to present the defendant as nothing
more than the heinous crime that has brought him into the court-
room facing the possibility of death. 44 By doing this, prosecuting at-
40. Id. (citingJoan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed
to Capital Jurors, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 1345, 1410-11). These same appellate judges also fre-
quently pass some of the moral weight of the decision to the executive and the clemency
power that accompanies that office. In a capital punishment case where the Court held
that a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence is not grounds for
federal habeas relief, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, who wrote for the majority, stated that exec-
utive clemency is the "fail-safe" of our criminal justice system. See Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390, 415 (1993). However, while often citing the sanctity of the jury process and thus
closing the loop, see Berlow, supra note 29, at 80, Governors have only granted clemency for
humanitarian reasons to forty-one death-row inmates since 1976. See Death Penalty Infor-
mation Center, Facts About Clemency, (visited Feb. 14, 2000) <http://www.essential.org/
dpic/clemency.html>. During this same period of time, 611 executions have taken place
in the United States. Death Penalty Information Center, Executions (visited Feb. 14, 2000)
<http://www.essential.org/dpic/facts.html#Executions>.
41. See Howarth, supra note 40, at 1411 ("U]ury capital sentencing could be seen as a
paradigm of collectivity as diffusion of and thus escape from responsibility.").
42. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion in making these selections has generated a
great deal of criticism. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages ofJustice in Capital
Cases, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1998); Debate, The Modem View of Capital Punish-
ment-the Honorable Alex Kozinski vs. Professor Stephen Bright, 34 AM. CRIM. L. Ruv. 1353, 1371-
72, 1377-78 (1997).
43. A paradigm, at both the guilt and capital penalty phase, that seeks to keep atten-
tion focused on "weapons and wounds, instrumentalities and effects." Haney, supra note
16, at 1469 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. As Professor Haney explained:
In the typical capital trial, prosecutors encourage jurors to make their ultimate
sentencing decision on the basis of isolated, albeit tragic and horrible, moments
of aggression that they offer, in the absence of any other information, to rep-
resent the defendant's entire life and worth as a person. This perfectly under-
standable and highly effective strategy is employed by advocates of death
sentences to project the alleged essence of the defendant into the snapshot that
has been taken of his violence.
Id. at 1456.
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torneys contribute mightily to the ability of capital jurors, and the
public at large, to disengage from the accused and come to see him as
something different from themselves.45 Once this view is established,
feelings of empathy for the accused become highly unlikely, thus les-
sening the jurors' burden in choosing death over life, and the public's
burden in supporting that choice.4 6
Like the prosecutors who champion the case for death, except in
those rare instances of a pro se defendant, all of those who advocate
in court against the imposition of the sanction in specific cases are
lawyers.47 To the extent that these attorneys, for whatever reason, fail
to present a mitigation case in sentencing,48 they, like the prosecutors
who demonize the defendant, make it easier for a juror to "morally
disengag[e] from the defendant's humanity" and render a verdict for
death.49 Furthermore, while the efforts of defense attorneys do not
offer an endorsement for capital punishment, those efforts do con-
tribute to the sanction's patina of legitimacy,5° just as do the efforts of
legally trained legislators, executives, judges, and prosecutors. Since
defense counsel are cast in the role of keeping the system honest and
45. See id. ("The prolonged period of time during which the jury is encouraged to
perceive the defendant only as an autonomous agent of violence acting outside of any
historical context dehumanizes him .... ").
46. See id. at 1461 ("The more we can designate a person as fundamentally different
from ourselves, the fewer moral doubts we have about condemning and hurting that per-
son." (quoting Samuel H. Pillsbury, EmotionalJustice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Pun-
ishment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 655, 692 (1989))).
47. Cf Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1845 n.56 (1994) (noting that a Mississippi
capital defendant was represented by a third-year law student and an attorney).
48. Reasons for this failure may include a lack of resources, inexperience, or incompe-
tence. See Bright, supra note 47, at 1836.
49. Haney, supra note 16, at 1458; see also Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 317-20, 334-39 (1983)
(discussing the defense counsel's duty to present mitigating evidence and identifying the
first element of an effective mitigation case as the portrayal of "the defendant as a human
being").
50. See MICHAEL A. MELLO, DEAD WRONG: A DEATH Row LAWYER SPEAKS OUT AGAINST
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 200-04 (1997) (suggesting that defense counsel might refuse to rep-
resent capital defendants in response to what the author sees as a critically defective and
unfair capital punishment system). After fourteen years of representing death row inmates
in postconviction proceedings, Michael Mello went on strike as a form of conscientious
objection. Id. at 3. Stephen Bright has taken issue with the suggestion that defense attor-
neys should cease representing capital defendants:
The machinery of death will grind on whether we participate or not. The exper-
iences of the last 20 years demonstrate that there is an endless supply of uncaring
lawyers who will take capital cases and help whisk their clients along to the execu-
tioner. The courts have made it clear that death sentences will be carried out
even if those lawyers were asleep or drunk.
See Death Penalty Debate, 20 CHAMPION 20, at 20 (Nov. 1996).
20001 563
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
faithful, they add to the ability of the system to maintain its respecta-
bility as it moves men along to their deaths.51
The two most controversial ways that doctors participate in the
American system of capital punishment are in the treatment of the
insane condemned and by attending at actual executions. 52 The Su-
preme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
death penalty from being carried out upon a prisoner who is insane.53
Therefore, before the state can execute a condemned man that has
lapsed into insanity it must make him sane, and that means employing
medical professionals to cure the mental affliction, if they can.
54 If
the man is made sane and ultimately executed, then a medical profes-
sional will frequently be on hand to certify the time of death,55 and in
some instances, may even participate in administering the mix of
drugs necessary to accomplish death by lethal injection.56
51. See generallyJack Stark, Shirley Jackson's "The Lottery, "in NICHOLASJ. KAROLIDES ET AL.,
CENSORED BOOKS: CRITICAL VIEWPOINTS 358, 359 (1993) (discussing The Lottery). Stark
noted:
One of her story's major ironies is that an activity leading to a triumph of antiso-
cial forces over civilized restraint is carried out very meticulously according to
"laws." That is, the methods used to choose the victim are codified, although not
in writing, and have the force of society behind them. That irony emphatically
makes the point that law not only does not guarantee safety but also can be used
to threaten safety....
Veneration of tradition, ritual and law causes the villagers to feel that their
actions are inevitable. That feeling in turn results in a denial of responsibility.
Id. (emphasis added).
52. See Christina Michales, Medical Ethics and the Execution Process in the United States of
America, 16 MED. & L. 125, 126-27 (1997).
53. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 408, 409-10 (1986) (reasoning that executing the
insane has no retributive or deterrent value and "simply offends humanity").
54. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3704 (West 1982) (noting that if a defendant is found
insane, his execution is suspended and he is committed to a medical facility for treatment
until such time when he recovers his sanity); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07(4) (West 1996 &
Supp. 1998) (same); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-57(2) (a) (1972) (same).
55. See, e.g., FLA STAT. ANN. § 922.11(2) (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-1041 (1997);
MIsS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-55(3) (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-233 (Michie 1998); see
also Doctor-Not Executioner: Physician Participation in Executions is a Line That Can't be
Crossed, Am. MED. NEWS, Apr. 11, 1994, Vol. 37, No. 14 (noting that almost two-thirds of the
thirty-six death penalty states require a physician's presence to pronounce the time of
death); MARQUART ET AL., supra note 22, at 239 (describing the Texas requirement that
physicians be present at executions to determine whether the inmates are dead (citing
post-1974 Texas Department of Corrections Procedures for the execution of death-sen-
tenced inmates)).
56. See Doctor-Not Executioner, supra note 55 ("In a twisted parody of medical treat-
ment, doctors have determined where to place the lines for lethal injection, and even on
occasion set them."); Michales, supra note 52, at 132 (reviewing state regulations that re-
quire the participation of physicians in lethal injection executions); see also LeeAnn
Lodder, Wio Will Aid The Executioner? In Missouri, Nurses Have Been Called in to Replace Doc-
tors, ANi. MED. NEWS, Mar. 1, 1993, at 2 (highlighting the active role nurses play in the
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The carrying out of any of these tasks has caused great contro-
versy within the medical profession,57 and it is not the purpose of this
Article to comment on the specifics of those debates. Rather, these
tasks are mentioned because they, like the actions of lawyers within
the process, send a message to the public that all is well. Curing the
insane, placing a catheter in a man's vein, and leaning over a corpse
to check for a pulse, are activities that allow executions to take on the
appearance of being something akin to a medical procedure.58 We
administration of the death penalty in Missouri, particularly as doctors' groups condemn
physician participation as unethical).
57. The physicians' role, authorized by many state statutes, of observing an execution
and pronouncing death is considered an ethical violation by professional medical organi-
zations. See Andrew A. Skolnick, Physicians in Missouri (But Not Illinois) Win Battle to Block
Physician Participation in Executions, 274JAMA 524 (1995). The American Medical Associa-
tion Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs issued an opinion that although "[a]n individ-
ual's opinion on capital punishment is the personal moral decision of the individual[, a]
physician . . .should not be a participant in a legally authorized execution." Council on
Ethical &Judicial Affairs, AMA, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS (1998); see
also Robert D. Truog & Troyen A. Brennan, Participation of Physicians in Capital Punishment,
329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1346, 1347-49 (1993) (analyzing the ethical considerations when
medical professionals participate in the various stages of the execution process); Lodder,
supra note 56 (noting that the American Nurses Association, similar to the AMA, considers
it a violation of ethical standards for nurses to participate in executions).
The continued participation of medical professionals in executions raises the issue of
how to enforce the professions' ethical codes. Thirteen California physicians sued the
California Corrections Department challenging physician participation in executions as a
violation of the medical code of ethics. See Diane M. Gianelli, Physicians Sue Over Califor-
nia's Use of Doctors in Executions, Am. MEn. NEWS, Aug. 11, 1997. Similarly, a group of Illinois
physicians requested that the Illinois Medical Disciplinary Board discipline physicians par-
ticipating in executions. See Skolnick, supra. To insulate participating physicians from ethi-
cal review by the state medical board, Illinois legislators amended the penal code to
provide anonymity for persons participating in executions and to declare that participation
in executions is not the practice of medicine. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/119-5(e) &
(g) (West Supp. 1999); see also Skolnick, supra. However, the explicit rationale behind this
"ethical waiver"-that participation is not the practice of medicine-directly conflicts with
the reason why Illinois legislators wanted physician participation-"to bring the skills of
physicians, and the accompanying legitimacy, to the execution process." Editorial, Conve-
nient Corruption: A Dispute About Executions Reveals Risk to Medical Ethics, Am. MED. NEWS, July
24, 1995 [hereinafter Convenient Corruption]; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/119-
5(a) (1) (requiring physicians to administer lethal injections and pronounce death "ac-
cording to accepted standards of medical practice").
58. See Gianelli, supra note 57 ("The physicians' brief says that when doctors use 'medi-
cal skills and knowledge to kill an individual in a procedure that mimics medical care, the
damage to the profession, the plaintiffs and the public is profound and irreparable."');
Convenient Corruption, supra note 57 (arguing that physician participation in executions at-
tempts to legitimize the process); Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, AMA, Physician
Participation in Capital Punishment, 270 JAMA 365, 366 (1993) ("The use of physicians and
medical technology in execution presents a conceptual contradiction for society and the
public. The image of physician as executioner under circumstances mimicking medical
care risks the general trust of the public." (citing The Ethics of Medical Participation in Capital
Punishment by Intravenous Drug Injection, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 226-30 (1980))).
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are assured that there is no torture taking place. There are no heads
flying off. There is only a sterile, mundane, routine medical practice
underway.59
Many reports out of death row inform us that the condemned was
ministered to by a member of the clergy just before he was led into
the death chamber and killed.6" Without intending to suggest that
any condemned person, if he is so inclined, should not seek solace
with the assistance of the clergy, it cannot be overlooked that in a
country with a strong sense of its religious tradition, the participation
of a pastor or priest in an execution contributes significantly to the
public's comfort level with that event. To hear that Karla Faye Tucker
read the Bible, prayed with her family, and praised Jesus just before
she was killed by lethal injection6" allows many of us to feel almost as if
the execution of this woman was the culmination of a glorious effort
to reform a sinner. That the reality of her reformation makes the
necessity of the execution all but non-existent gets lost in the fact that
we are unwilling to forget that she owes a duty not only to God, but
also to man, and we take our duty not in words, but in life's own
breath.62
While I have suggested that the masking efforts in The Lottery of-
fer a parallel to our own efforts to hide the evil of our capital punish-
ment system, on one level the inhabitants of ShirleyJackson's fictional
village have something on the inhabitants of our own very real coun-
try. While we allow ourselves to turn a blind eye to the injustices and
inhumanities of our death penalty, Ms. Jackson's villagers accept the
responsibility of facing, in the first person, the consequence of their
tradition. They, each and every one," take a direct part in the stoning
59. See, e.g., Truog & Brennan, supra note 57, at 1347 ("As a nurse anesthetist who was
hired to perform lethal injections in Missouri notes, 'It's a very sanitary, very sterile, very
benign way to do an execution."'). But see Michales, supra note 52, at 151 ("The argument
that lethal injection and medical sanction are wrong because they sanitize executioner is
based on the supposition that the death penalty is itself immoral. Exactly the same argu-
ment can be used to advocate physician participation.").
60. See generally Crime & Punishment: The Death House (ABC Nightline television broad-
cast,Jan. 16, 1995) (discussing with Reverend Carroll Picket, Chaplin to Texas's death row
in Huntsville, the practice of ministering to the condemned).
61. See Mike Ward & Rebeca Rodriquez, Texas Executes Tucker, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Feb. 4, 1998, at Al.
62. Cf id. (quoting the Chairman of the Texas criminal justice board, who said,
"[a]lthough I believe she finally found God, her religious awakening could in no way ex-
cuse or mitigate her actions in the world she just left" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
63. Even Tessie Hutchinson's little son, Davy, is encouraged to throw pebbles at his
mother. Jackson, supra note 1, at 397.
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of Tessie Hutchinson.6 4 We, on the other hand, sleep soundly in our
beds or enjoy some late night television as our fellow citizens receive
the prescribed dose of electricity, gas, or drugs that will take their
lives.
II. EXECUTING THE INNOCENT
Just as Mr. Summers finally left off talking and turned to the assem-
bled villagers, Mrs. Hutchinson came hurriedly along the path to the
square, her sweater thrown over her shoulders, and slid into place in
the back of the crowd. "Clean forgot what day it was," she said to
Mrs. Delacroix, who stood next to her, and they both laughed softly.
"Thought my old man was out back stacking wood," Mrs.
Hutchinson went on, "and then I looked out the window and the
kids was gone, and then I remembered it was the twenty-seventh and
came arunning." She dried her hands on her apron, and Mrs. Dela-
croix said, "You're in time, though. They're still talking away up
there."
Mrs. Hutchinson craned her neck to see through the crowd and
found her husband and children standing near the front. She
tapped Mrs. Delacroix on the arm as a farewell and began to make
her way through the crowd. The people separated good-humoredly to
let her through; two or three people said, in voices just loud enough to
be heard across the crowd, "Here comes your Mrs., Hutchinson, "and
"Bill, she made it after all." Mrs. Hutchinson reached her husband,
and Mr. Summers, who had been waiting, said cheerfully, "Thought
we were going to have to get on without you, Tessie." Mrs.
Hutchinson said, grinning, "Wouldn't have me leave m'dishes in
the sink, now, would you, Joe ?," and soft laughter ran through the
crowd as the people stirred back into position after Mrs. Hutchin-
son's arrival.6 5
It is about a third of the way into the story that the reader is intro-
duced to Tessie Hutchinson, and from this introduction a number of
things can be surmised about her. She is a wife and mother, and ap-
parently a homemaker. She is well-known to the community, and
seems to be liked by many. And she is, for all appearances, an inno-
cent.66 At no point in The Lottery is it ever even remotely suggested
64. It has been suggested that instead of devoted followers of tradition, the villagers are
"bloodthirsty victimizers" who look forward to the annual slaughter of one of their own.
See A. R. Coulthard, Jackson's The Lottery, 48 EXPLICATOR 226, 228 (1990).
65. Jackson, supra note 1, at 392-93.
66. This is one of the reasons the response to the publication of The Lottery was so
"instant and cataclysmic" and reflected "an unprecedented outpouring of fury, horror,
rage, disgust, and intense fascination." Id. at 128-29.
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that Tessie Hutchinson earned the fate of being stoned to death be-
cause she committed a criminal offense or even a communal faux
pax.67 Although Mrs. Hutchinson's character falters as she senses the
possibility of her own demise increasing in step with the lottery's pro-
gression,6" in the eyes of our criminal law she is an innocent person
that is nevertheless killed.69 In this sense, Tessie Hutchinson shares
the sad fortune of some of our fellow citizens who find themselves
accused of capital crimes. Just as Mrs. Hutchinson is innocent of any
crime, so are some percentage of the men, women, and children7 0
who are executed within the United States innocent 71 of the crimes
that get them killed.
The danger of executing an innocent person has been a source
of concern for at least a century and a half in the United States.72 At
67. See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 2, at 131 (quoting Shirley Jackson as describing the
events depicted in The Lottery as "pointless violence").
68. When Mrs. Hutchinson realizes that a member of her family will be stoned that
year, she tries to pull her married daughter and son-in-law into the pool to reduce the
likelihood that she will be selected. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 395. One scholar has
suggested that this was Tessie's "most grievous failure." Fritz Oehlschlaeger, The Stoning of
Mistress Hutchinson: Meaning and Context in "The Lottery, " 15 EssAYS IN LITERATURE 259, 262
(1988).
69. On a different level, Tessie Hutchinson is not so innocent. Not only does she at-
tempt to make her married daughter and son-in-law eligible for that year's lottery, see
supra note 68, but, prior to her family's selection in the first drawing, she is a willing partici-
pant in a process that will shortly result in the murder of someone in her village. SeeJay A.
Yarmove, Jackson's The Lottery, 48 EXPLICATOR 242, 244 (1990).
70. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is not violated
by a sentence of capital punishment for an individual who committed murder at sixteen or
seventeen years of age). For some, this practice of executing teenagers is not extreme
enough, as they would support even younger children being sent to death row. See, e.g.,
Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas Legislator Proposes the Death Penalty for Murderers as Young as 11,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1998, at Al (noting that Texas State legislator Jim Pitts, Republican,
proposed a bill that would allow Texas to impose the death penalty on murderers as young
as eleven years old).
71. The term "innocent" in this context is meant to be equated with "actual inno-
cence." See MICHAEL KRONENWETTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 227 (1993) (defining actual in-
nocence as a "claim that a defendant, or convicted person, did not commit the crime," and
distinguishing actual innocence "from the mere legal innocence of someone found not
guilty because of lack of proof, or whose conviction may be overturned on technical
grounds"); Carter Center Symposium on the Death Penalty-July 24, 1997, 14 GA. ST. U.L. REv.
329, 376 (1998) [hereinafter Carter Center Symposium] ("Innocence means basically that...
[a person] has been charged with something and convicted of something that [he] did not
do." (comments of Bryan Stevenson)); Mark V. Tushnet, The Politics of Executing the Inno-
cent: TheDeath Penalty in the Next Century?, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 261, 261 (1991) ("When I say
that an innocent person will be executed .... I mean that a state will execute a person for a
crime that he or she did not commit." (footnotes omitted)).
72. See HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 87 (1996) ("[C]oncern over
the possibility of miscarriages ofjustice .. .was expressed at least as early as the 1820s by
568
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various points in that history, critics and proponents of the death pen-
alty have debated the possibility of this event, but for most of this time
the debate remained on a hypothetical level due to a lack of reliable
information on the subject. 73 However, this changed dramatically in
1987 with the publication of a law review article by Professors Bedau
and Radelet that claimed, with great support, that between the years
1900 and 1986, 139 people had been wrongly convicted of a capital
crime and twenty-three had been executed.7 ' These findings have
subsequently been updated by Bedau and Radelet 75 and others, 76 and
the totality of these efforts have established with certainty that we have
reformer Edward Livingston, and throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by
such critics as Charles C. Burleigh, Horace Greeley, William Howells, and Sing-Sing warden
Lewis Lawes, as well as by the American League to Abolish Capital Punishment." (internal
citations omitted)).
73. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 14, at 234-35 (discussing conflicting
positions on the likelihood of the danger and the editor's own efforts to define the extent
of the problem).
74. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Capi-
tal Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 36 tbl. 2 (1987) [hereinafter Miscarriages of Justice]. But see
Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet
Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 126-33, 145-50 (1988) (claiming that Bedau and Radelet's study
was flawed because much of the material they relied on was irrelevant and their methodol-
ogy was overly subjective, and rebutting the study's conclusion that the risk of erroneous
executions was too high to justify the imposition of the death penalty). For Bedau and
Radelet's response to Markman and Cassell's critique, see Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L.
Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161, 169-70
(1988) (concluding that Markman and Cassell's criticisms of the authors' study stemmed
from "unacknowledged political roots," as both of the critics were members of the Depart-
ment ofJustice under the Reagan Administration, which "made quite clear its support for
the death penalty").
75. See MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERPRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN
CAPITAL CASES 369 (1992) (identifying 416 cases on wrongful convictions); Michael L.
Radelet et al., Prisoners Released From Death Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their Guilt,
13 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 907, 916 (1996) ("Our Appendix includes 68 cases of death row
inmates later released because of doubts about their guilt. With 313 executions in the
United States between 1970 and the end of 1995, one death row inmate is released because
of innocence for every five inmates executed." (footnotes omitted)).
76. See STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 103D CONG.,
INNOCENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: ASSESSING THE DANGER OF MISTAKEN EXECUTIONS 3 &
n.3 (Comm. Print 1994) (identifying, since 1973, fifty-two people who were released from
death row because of their innocence). The House Subcommittee's report information
principally comes from newspaper articles, Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice, supra
note 74, RADELET ET AL., supra note 75, and the National Coalition to Abolish the Death
Penalty. But cf Alan I. Bigel, Justices WilliamJ Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall on Capital
Punishment: Its Constitutionality, Morality, Deterrent Effect, and Interpretation by the Court, 8 No-
TRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 11, 86 (1994) ("The precise number-or, indeed,
whether any verifiable instances of wrongful execution have taken place-can never be
determined because methods of ascertaining the reliability or admissibility of evidence,
both at the time of an arrest and trial many years after a sentence is pronounced, are
imprecise.").
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executed innocent people in the past and that we will continue to do
so in the future.77
For three reasons, it is not enough to say in response to these
findings that the small number of innocent persons who have been
executed or put under the threat of execution is proof that the system
works. First, just as it was no comfort to Tessie Hutchinson that she
was to be the only member of her village that was stoned that year, it is
no comfort to those whom we send to their death or threaten with
death notwithstanding their innocence that they are one of a small
few.7 8 Statistically, the numbers may not be overwhelming, 79 but for
each of those who suffer this undeserved fate the number is too large
by one.8" Second, it is an insult to those "lucky" few who are released
77. SeeJustice John Stevens, Opening Assembly Address at the American Bar Associa-
tion Annual Meeting (Aug. 3, 1996) ("[Rlecent development of reliable scientific eviden-
iary methods has made it possible to establish conclusively that a disturbing number of
persons who had been sentenced to death were actually innocent."); Ken Armstrong &
Steve Mills, Ryan Suspends Death Penalty Illinois First State to Impose Moratorium on Executions,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2000, at 1. Based upon the fear that an innocent person might be
executed, Governor George Ryan declared a moratorium on capital punishment in Illi-
nois. Id.; see also Radelet et al., supra note 75, at 920-21 (noting the increasingly hostile
reception that claims of innocence receive at all levels of government-from funding cuts,
to the provision of legal assistance to capital inmates, to stagnant review of sentences by
governors, to restrictive case law). See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993)
(holding that claims of actual innocence, based on newly discovered evidence, are not
grounds for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation); Betty B.
Fletcher, The Death Penalty in America: Can Justice be Done?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 811, 818-24
(1995) (discussing how the Supreme Court has limited the availability of habeas corpus
review in recent years, thereby adding to the already difficult task of overturning an erro-
neous conviction); Tara L. Swafford, Note, Responding to Herrera v. Collins: Ensuring That
Innocents are not Executed, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 603 (1995) (analyzing the impact of the
Supreme Court's decision in Herrera and concluding that this decision makes executions
easier to impose).
78. Cf RADELET ET AL., supra note 75, at 273 ("[T]he small number of cases . . . in
which an innocent person was executed is an indication not of the fairness of the system
but rather of its finality.").
79. SeeJoseph P. Shapiro, The Wrong Men on Death Row, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov.
9, 1998, at 22 ("For every 7 executions-486 since 1976-1 other prisoner on death row
has been found innocent."); see also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
80. Cf HAINES, supra note 72, at 91 (noting that even if a wrongful execution is averted,
a tragic error has still taken place given the "depriv[ation] ... of freedom" and the "psy-
chological torment" that accompanies life on death row); Shigemitsu Dando, Toward the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 72 IND. L.J. 7, 14 (1996) (characterizing the imposition of the
death penalty upon an innocent prisoner as a crime "committed by nobody else but the
state itself"). Dando commented:
The terrific agony felt by the innocent prisoner being executed must be far be-
yond the imagination of others. The anguish of the innocent person executed
must be incomparably greater than that ordinarily felt by a prisoner who had
actually committed the crime. Just imagine the prisoner who mounts the gallows
shouting and crying aloud desperately: "I am not the offender! I did not commit
the crime!" This is nothing but what Dostoyevsky called "an outrage on the soul."
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from death row after their innocence is finally accepted by the crimi-
nal justice system to hold them up as examples of the system working
properly to correct its mistakes."1 Any system that brands innocent
men, and women, and children as murderers, locks them behind bars,
threatens them with a state sanctioned execution can hardly be said to
be working properly.8 2 Third, it would be the height of arrogance to
believe that we are only talking about those cases where researchers
and investigators have been able to determine that an innocent per-
son was executed or threatened with execution. On top of all of the
cases where evidence has uncovered a wrongful capital conviction or,
worse yet, an execution, there are others that pass into and through
our death chambers undetected.
8 3
Id.
81. See Henry Weinstein, Death Penalty Foes Focus Effort on the Innocent, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
16, 1998, at Al ("The fact that some innocent people have been found on death row does
not mean that the system is failing, contends Paul G. Cassell, a former federal prosecutor
and now a law professor at the University of Utah. 'They were exonerated through the
system we have today,' he said."); Stephen A. Chaplin, Death Penalty Foes Don't Make Case,
RiCHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Nov. 23, 1998, at A8 ("[T]he reversals demonstrate, if any-
thing, that the legal mechanisms now in place work.").
82. On average, it takes a little over seven years to correct a miscarriage ofjustice. See
Radelet et al., supra note 75, at 966 tbl.4. During this time, the lives death row inmates left
behind continue on without them. See, e.g., Don Terry, Survivors Make the Case Against Death
Row, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1998, at A14 ("After six years on death row, [Walter McMillian]
lost his logging business and his marriage. Sonia Jacobs went to prison as a wife and a
mother. When she got out, she was a widow and a grandmother.").
83. Sentiments to this effect have been expressed by members of the high courts at
both the federal and state levels. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367-68 (1972) (per
curiam) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("No matter how careful courts are, the possibility of
perjured testimony, mistaken honest testimony, and human error remain all too real. We
have no way of judging how many innocent persons have been executed but we can be
certain that there were some." (footnote omitted)); KRONENWETrER, supra note 71, at 46
("As Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas once wrote: '[Olur system of criminal
justice does not work with the efficiency of a machine-errors are made, and innocent as
well as guilty people are sometimes punished .... [T]he sad truth is that a cog in the
machine often slips; memories fail; mistaken identifications are made; those who wield the
power of life and death itself-the police officer, the witness, the prosecutor, the juror,
and even the judge-become overzealous .. " (alternation in original) (quoting Furman,
408.U.S. 238 (Marshall, J., concurring)) Justice has 'doubts about inmates' guilt, F.W. STAR
TELEGRAM, Dec. 24, 1998, at A5 (retiring Florida Supreme Court Justice Gerald Kogan
expressed "'grave doubts'" about the guilt of those individuals executed during his ten-
ure); see also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Crisis in Capital Punishment, 31 MD. L. REv. 289, 296
(1971) (noting that "the possibility of mistake, however small in each single case, adds up
to affirmative probability in a long run of cases, and to virtual certainty in a sufficiently
long run"); Dando, supra note 80, at 14 ("[J]udges are well trained and have enough expe-
rience in dealing with findings. Even so, as long as they are human beings, nobody can
claim that they do not make mistakes. They are not God; they are not omnipotent. Gulli-
bility is inherent to human beings."); Joseph M. Giarratano, "To The Best of Our Knowledge, We
Have Never Been Wrong" Fallibility vs. Finality in Capital Punishment, 100 YALE L.J. 1005, 1008
(1991) ("No careful student of the reality (as opposed to the theory) of capital punishment
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Just as the ghost of Tessie Hutchinson lingers on the page as one
finishes The Lottery,84 so does the ghost of the innocent man linger
over our system of capital punishment."5 This has long been the one
issue that has caused even ardent proponents of the death penalty to
hesitate, 6 because, notwithstanding the benefits we incur by bringing
criminal proceedings to an expeditious end, "[t]here is little societal
interest in permitting the criminal [justice] process to rest at a point
where it ought properly never to repose."87 When Old Man Warner,
Steve Adams, and Mrs. Graves pick up their stones and cast them at
the pleading Tessie Hutchinson they are participating in murder.
When we execute an innocent person, we come perilously close to
murder ourselves.8
III. ARBITRARILY SELECTING THOSE WHO DIE
"All right, "Mr. Summers said. "Open the papers. Harry, you open
little Dave's. "
Mr. Graves opened the slip of paper and there was a general sigh
through the crowd as he held it up and everyone could see that it was
blank. Nancy and Bill, Jr., opened theirs at the same time, and both
beamed and laughed, turning around to the crowd and holding their
slips of paper above their heads.
"Tessie," Mr. Summers said. There was a pause, and then Mr.
Summers looked at Bill Hutchinson, and Bill unfolded his paper
and showed it. It was blank.
can cling for long to the notion that ours is an infallible system. On the contrary, we are
admittedly fallible people struggling to approximate infallible judgments.").
84. SeeJames M. Gibson, An Old Testament Analoguefor"The Lottery," 11J. MOD. LITERA-
TURE 193, 195 (1984) (characterizing Tessie's fate as a undeserved punishment "which can
only be labeled senseless, meaningless, and capricious").
85. Cf United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) ("Our procedure has
been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted."). In writing these
words, Judge Learned Hand made it clear that he was not offering a sympathetic ear. He
called the specter of this ghost "an unreal dream" and complained of the "archaic formal-
ism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime."
Id.
86. See, e.g., HAINES, supra note 72, at 91-92 ("Nevertheless, the shadow of doubt con-
cerning the infallibility of the judicial system seems to temper the enthusiasm of many
people for capital punishment. .. .").
87. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 677, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
88. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 446 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The
execution of a person who can show that he is innocent comes perilously close to simple
murder."); see also Dando, supra note 80, at 14 ("[Execution of an innocent] is no longer a
punishment for the criminal. This is indeed a crime, and a most atrocious one, committed
by nobody else but the state itself.").
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"It's Tessie, " Mr. Summers said, and his voice was hushed. "Show
us her paper, Bill."
Bill Hutchinson went over to his wife and forced the slip of paper out
of her hand. It had a black spot on it, the black spot Mr. Summers
had made the night before with the heavy pencil in the coal company
office. Bill Hutchinson held it up, and there was a stir in the
crowd.8 9
Selecting who will be stoned in Ms. Jackson's fictional village is a
two-step process. First, the head of each household draws a lot to de-
termine whether the victim will come from his or her family. Second,
each member of the household then draws a slip of paper to deter-
mine which of them will be killed.90 At the culmination of this pro-
cess, Tessie Hutchinson is marked for death by a black spot on a slip
of paper.
9 1
While I earlier wrote that the process that condemned Tessie
Hutchinson to die is worlds apart from what goes on in American
courtrooms wherein the fate of capital defendants are decided; upon
reflection, maybe the two have more in common than I, or we, would
like to acknowledge. When we stop to consider the role that arbitrary
factors play in deciding who gets the death penalty and who does not,
maybe it is that earlier statement that is of another world and not the
effort to draw comparisons between the process that condemned Mrs.
Hutchinson and the process that condemns capital defendants across
this country. Too often in our criminal justice system, the effort to
separate those who will die from those who will live is arbitrarily influ-
enced by the skill or commitment, or lack thereof, of the defendant's
lawyer, by the personal biases of the trial judge who presides over the
case, or even by the race of the defendant and/or his victim.
In 1994, Stephen Bright, the Director of the Southern Center for
Human Rights, produced an article that is a list of horrors of the kind
of representation that too many capital defendants receive. 92 In his
article, Bright details instances of defense counsel falling asleep dur-
ing trial,93 showing up drunk for the day's proceedings, 4 referring to
89. Jackson, supra note 1, at 397.
90. Id. at 393.
91. Id. at 397.
92. See Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 47.
93. Id. at 1843.
94. See id. at 1835, 1843 (citing Haney v. State, 603 So. 2d 368, 377 (Ala. Crim. App.
1991); People v. Garrison, 254 Cal. Rptr. 257, 278 (1989)).
2000]
MARYLAND LAVW REVIEW
their clients in racially derogatory ways,9 5 not having any understand-
ing of the law of capital punishment,96 and failing to undertake even
the bare minimum of an investigation so that they may effectively
represent people who are on trial for their lives.97 Bright is not alone
in pointing out that, in too many cases, whether you get the death
penalty or not, depends far too heavily on whether you have a mini-
mally qualified attorney or one of the incompetents detailed in
Bright's and others' works.9 8 This situation has gotten so bad and
achieved such recognition, that in 1997 the American Bar Association
took the extraordinary step of calling for a moratorium on capital
punishment prosecutions across the country until qualified attorneys
are made available to represent these defendants.99 The fact that this
plea has largely fallen on deaf ears in those places where it counts, 100
95. See id. at 1843 (citing Dunge v. Kemp, 782 F.2d 896 (4th Cir. 1985); Issacs v. Kemp,
778 F.2d 1482 (l1th Cir. 1985); Goodwin v. Balbeim, 684 F.2d 794, 825 n.13 (lth Cir.
1982); Ex parte Guzman, 730 So. 2d 724, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).
96. See id. at 1859.
97. See id. at 1835.
98. See Berlow, supra note 29, at 82 ("Among the evidence marshaled to demonstrate
the abysmal representation that many capital defendants receive, the author cites to an
investigation by the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy which found that 25 percent
of death-row inmates (in that state) had been represented at trial by attorneys who had
since been disbarred or had resigned to avoid disbarment."); Goodpaster, supra note 49, at
300-03 (contrasting two capital cases with comparable crimes and defendant life stories,
but in only one case did the defendant receive a death sentence and attributing this differ-
ence in outcomes to the competency of the counsel arguing the cases); Michael L. Perlin,
"The Executioner's Face is Always Well-Hidden": The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining
Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 201, 202-07 (1996) (reviewing a large variety of sources
detailing the shortcomings of the capital defense bar and the lack of judicial action to
alleviate these shortcomings); Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More just and Effective System of Re-
view in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 Am. U. L. REv. 1, 69 (1990) ("[T]he inadequacy of
[defense] representation at the trial level greatly increases the risk of convictions that are
flawed by fundamental factual, legal, or constitutional error.").
99. See American Bar Association, House of Delegates Resolution 107 (Feb. 3, 1997)
(visited Feb. 14, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/irr/rec107.html>. The ABA called for a
moratorium until such time when a jurisdiction implements guidelines to ensure the ap-
pointment of competent counsel, to improve the post-appellate review process, to work
toward the elimination of racial discrimination in sentencing, and to prevent the execution
of mentally retarded persons and defendants who were minors at the time of their of-
fenses. Id.; cf. Michael D. Wims, Debating ABA's Death Penalty Resolution: Bad Process, Bad
Result, A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JusT. REP., Fall 1998, at 18, 19 (reprinting the dissent by the ABA
Criminal Justice Section's Prosecution Function Committee opposing the ABA call for a
death penalty moratorium). It should be noted that only 53% of the House of Delegated
voted in favor of the resolution. Id. at 18.
100. No state has changed its death penalty practices in direct response to the adoption
of the ABA resolution. See id. There have been developments, however, that have limited
or attempted to limit the death penalty that have probably been facilitated by the ABA
resolution. For example, Illinois Governor George Ryan declared a moratorium on capital
punishment on January 31, 2000, in response to his state's record of sentencing innocent
people to death. See Armstrong & Mills, supra note 77, at 1. Prior to this action by Gover-
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suggests that fairness is not the priority of the process; rather, the pri-
ority is to keep the conveyor belt of death moving.'
Even more disturbing than the inadequacies of defense counsel
are the recurrent failures of the judiciary to insist upon fairness in
selecting those who will die in our death chambers. In many jurisdic-
tions, judges are responsible for assigning defense counsel to indigent
criminal cases, to include capital cases, and not only do they assign the
incompetents discussed above, but all too often they continue to as-
sign them even after their shortcomings are evident for all to see.
102
Even if the initial assignments are the result of a system that refuses to
pay a living wage to attorneys who will take capital cases,'0° the old
adage "fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me" has
deadly application when these counsel return to court seeking an-
other death eligible client. Worse yet, where the initial and the follow-
on assignments are the result of political favoritism, as they apparently
are in some parts of the country,'0 4 the criminal justice system literally
nor Ryan, the Illinois Supreme Court and General Assembly appointed separate commit-
tees to study possible reforms of capital punishment in that state. See Maurice Possley &
Ken Armstrong, Revamp Urged in Handling of Capital Cases: Study Seeks Higher Attorney Stan-
dards, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 1999, at 1. Additionally, on May 20, 1999, the Nebraska Legisla-
ture passed a bill that would have put a two-year ban on executions while a study was
conducted to see if the penalty was being applied fairly in the state. See State Votes to Halt
Executions, NAT. L.J., May 31, 1999, at A6. This measure, however, was vetoed by Nebraska
Governor Mike Johanns just six days later. See Robynn Tysver, Moratorium Vetoed Death-
Penalty Timeout Is Poor Policy, Johanns Says, OFHi'.A WORLD-HERALD, May 26, 1999, at 1.
101. See Richard Perez-Pena, The Death Penalty: When There's No Room for Error, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2000, at 3 (quoting Professor Franklin Ziming that "[tihere is a great
desire to have assembly-line executions" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
102. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 29, at 802 (providing examples of judicial assign-
ment of incompetent attorneys). Bright and Keenan noted:
U] udges in Houston, Texas have repeatedly appointed an attorney who occasion-
ally falls asleep in court, and is known primarily for hurrying through capital trials
like "greased lightning" without much questioning or making objections. Ten of
his clients have received death sentences. Similarly, judges in Long Beach, Cali-
fornia, assigned the representation of numerous indigent defendants to a lawyer
who tried cases in very little time, not even obtaining discovery in some of them.
The attorney has the distinction of having more of his clients sentenced to death,
eight, than any other attorney in California.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
103. See Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 47, at 1838, 1844 (noting that the low
compensation for court-appointed lawyers contributes to the lack of experienced attorneys
willing to defend capital cases); Viveca Novak, The Cost of Poor Advice, TimE, July 5, 1999, at
38 ("Alabama's legislature last year voted an increase in the $1000 top fee for lawyers han-
dling death-penalty cases only to have the Governor veto it.").
104. See, e.g., Bright & Keenan, supra note 29, at 803 (citing a study that found that
"Philadelphia's poor [capital] defendants often find themselves being represented by ward
leaders, ward committeemen, failed politicians, the sons of judges and party leaders, and
contributors to the judge's election campaign." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
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devolves into trading lives for political gain. Ultimately, whatever the
cause of the difficulty in securing qualified counsel for these defend-
ants, there can be no justification for assigning a man on trial for his
life an attorney who is not only not going to help his cause, but who is
in fact going to increase the probability of a death result because of
the attorney's incompetence and/or neglect.
Aside from the appointment of counsel, the trial judge obviously
exerts tremendous influence over the outcome of the findings portion
of a capital case through his or her rulings on such issues as suppres-
sion motions, evidentiary objections, and the drafting of instruc-
tions.'0 5 Furthermore, once a finding of guilt has been returned, in a
number of jurisdictions the trial judge either personally decides
whether a convicted defendant will receive the death penalty10 6 or re-
tains the ability to override ajury's recommendation for life.107 In the
exercise of these powers, one would hope that ourjudges would strive
to maintain their, and the system's, integrity by ensuring that every
decision is based soundly upon the law and the facts, but the reality is
that the influence of politics plays a disturbing role in this process.
The combination of the political clout of capital punishment as
an electoral issue' 08 and the popular election of trial court judges'0 9
has created a deadly mix across the country. Proclamations of support
ing Fredric N. Tulsky, Big-Time Trials; Small Time Defenses, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 14, 1992,
at Al).
105. Cf id. at 792-93 (arguing that judges fail "to enforce the most fundamental right of
all, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, in capital cases"). The political liability elected
judges face for their rulings in well known cases "make it virtually impossible forjudges to
enforce the constitutional protections to a fair trial for the accused." Id. at 793.
106. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.B. (West Supp. 1999) (presiding judge de-
termines sentence); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2520 (1995) (presiding judge or, upon re-
quest, a panel of three judges determines sentence). The Supreme Court has held that a
judge alone sentencing in capital trials is constitutional. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738, 745 (1990) ("Any argument that the Constitution requires that ajury impose the
sentence of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has
been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court."); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,
464 (1984) ("[W]e cannot conclude that placing responsibility on the trial judge to impose
the sentence in a capital case is unconstitutional.").
107. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(f), (g) (1994) (describing ajury verdict as only "advi-
sory"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West Supp. 1998) (declaring that the court shall
independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and then enter a sen-
tence "[n]otwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury"); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-50-2-9(e) (Michie 1998) (stating that the court need only consider the jury's recom-
mendation prior to determining the sentence). The Supreme Court has upheld the con-
stitutionality of jury override death penalty schemes. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504,
515 (1995) (upholding Alabama's statute); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 462-65 (upholding Flor-
ida's statute).
108. See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS (1998) (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., NCJ-176356, 1999),
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for state sponsored executions have played prominently in judicial
candidates' election campaigns1 ' and in superfluous homilies from
the bench."1 ' Furthermore, judges have gone out of their way to use
their participation in individual capital cases to encourage re-election
to their current station or as spring board towards attaining a position
on a higher court.' 12 A capital defendant would be justified in won-
dering how he could possibly get a fair trial once he learns that his
judge has let it be known far and wide that he or she adamantly sup-
ports the death penalty." 3 And to the extent any of the rest of us care
about fairness in the process, we should be wondering the same thing
ourselves.'
138 tbl.2.56 (demonstrating that between 1965 and 1997, national support for the death
penalty has grown from 38 percent to 75 percent).
109. See id. at 71-72 tbl.1.66 (showing that a majority of states elect their trial court
judges).
110. See, e.g., Nevius v. Warden, 944 P.2d 858, 859 (Nev. 1997) (per curiam) (refusing to
disqualify Nevada Supreme CourtJustice Cliff Young from a death penalty case because he
trumpeted his judicial crime-fighting record in the course of his reelection campaign by
stating that he had upheld the death penalty 76 times); BESSLER, supra note 23, at 139-40
(reporting that in judicial elections in Texas and in California, individuals have been voted
in and out of office because of their death penalty opinions, or distortions thereof);
Berlow, supra note 29, at 80 (commenting on judges and judicial candidates who campaign
"for office with promises to impose the death sentence at every opportunity"); Bright &
Keenan, supra note 29, at 784-92 (examining how the death penalty impacts upon ajudge's
career in terms of election, retention, and promotion).
111. See, e.g., BESSLER, supra note 23, at 141 (quoting Texas Judge William Harmon, a
former prosecutor, as stating in a 1991 capital trial "that he was doing 'God's work' to see
that the defendant was executed").
112. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 29, at 787-88 (discussing instances when judges
sought to be assigned to death penalty cases or refused reasonable requests for continu-
ances because they wanted to have the publicity of a death penalty decision prior to an
upcoming election); see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 713 n.4 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[E]lected judges too often appear to listen ... [to] the many voters who
generally favor capital punishment but who have far less information about a particular
trial than the jurors who have sifted patiently through the details of the relevant and admis-
sible evidence.").
113. Cf Nevius, 944 P.2d at 859 (refusing to disqualify a judge on the basis of general
pro-death penalty statements made in a re-election campaign, the court noted that a "gen-
eral philosophical orientation" is not grounds for recusing ajudge).
114. See Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence be Attained in the South? Overcoming
History, Elections, and Misperceptions About the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 817,
859-60 (1998) (arguing that a fair judicial process cannot be achieved in the South until
the system is divorced from monied special interest groups and passionate public opinion
and advocating the elimination of elected judgeships and replacing them with a merit
selection system); see also Stephen B. Bright, Casualties of the War on Crime: Fairness, Reliabil-
ity and the Credibility of Criminal Jastice Systems, 51 U. MtAMI L. REV. 424 (1997) (arguing that
to create a fair system of justice "all parts of the community must be involved in the
process").
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Perhaps even more distressing than the impact that incompetent
defense counsel and biased judges have on our American system of
capital punishment, is the role that race plays in administering the
sanction. In 1987, in McCleskey v. Kemp,' 1 5 the Supreme Court was
faced with compelling and uncontroverted proof that whether you re-
ceived the death penalty in Georgia was slightly influenced by the
color of your skin and greatly influenced by the color of your victim's
skin." 6 Notwithstanding these facts, the Court denied the petitioner
any relief because, in its opinion, the racial discrepancies did "not
demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting
the Georgia capital sentencing process."'" 7 This result led Anthony
Lewis to charge that the Court's opinion "condon[es] the expression
of racism in a profound aspect of our law,""1 8 and Randall Kennedy to
state that "the majority in McCleskey repressed the truth and validated
racially oppressive official conduct.""' 9
Since McCleskey, subsequent investigations have established that
race continues to play a critical role in administering our American
system of capital punishment. One study of Philadelphia's death pen-
alty practices found, among other distressing conclusions, that "the
average black defendant's probability of receiving a death sentence is
1.6... times greater than a similarly situated nonblack defendant."120
A review of the records from the Chattahoochee Judicial District in
Georgia has shown that from 1973 through the end of 1990 the dis-
trict attorney's office "sought the death penalty 38.7 percent of the
time when the defendant was black and the victim white, 32.4 percent
when both defendant and victim were white, 5.9 percent when both
defendant and victim were black, and never when the defendant was
white and the victim black.'' 2 1 A review of death sentences in Harris
115. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
116. See id. at 287 (examining a study of the 2000 murder cases in Georgia during the
1970s that found that black defendants had 1.1 times greater chance of receiving a death
sentence as other defendants, and defendants who killed whites had a 4.3 times greater
chance of receiving a death sentence as defendants who killed blacks). For the complete
results of this study, see DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUALJUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990).
117. McCleshey, 481 U.S. at 313 (footnote omitted).
118. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Su-
preme Court, 101 HARv. L. Ray. 1388, 1388 (1988) (quoting Anthony Lewis, Bowing to Ra-
cism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1987, at A31).
119. Id.
120. David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman
Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent Findings From Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1638, 1726 (1998).
121. Michael Kroll, Chattahoochee Judicial District: Buckle of the Death Belt (1991) (visited
Nov. 8, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpic.rll.html>.
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County, Texas, by the Houston Post found that blacks were sentenced
to death twice as often as whites. 2 2 Furthermore, after analyzing
twenty-eight studies of death penalty sentencing results, the General
Accounting Office stated that within the states that were the subjects
of these studies, "those who murdered whites were ... more likely to
be sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks." '23 In short,
a factor which, at another time, the Supreme Court has called "irrele-
vant and therefore prohibited,"' 2 4 has so attached itself to our system
of capital punishment that fairness in the implementation of that sys-
tem within our multi-racial society seems a near, if not absolute,
impossibility.
While there are other ways that arbitrariness sneaks into our
American system of capital punishment, 125 the incompetence of de-
fense counsel, the bias of trial judges, and the disheartening role of
race, serve as the prime indicators for just how morally bankrupt our
system has become.1 26 Once the full scope of this disrepair is recog-
nized, it becomes far more difficult to say that the process that con-
demned Tessie Hutchinson is worlds apart from what goes on in
American courtrooms in deciding the fate of capital defendants. To
borrow a thought from a different time, the process by which we select
the condemned appears to have the same sense of justice as that ex-
122. See Bryan Denson, Death Penalty: Equal Justice?, Hous. POST, Oct. 16, 1994, at Al.
The significance of this disparity is intensified when one considers that Harris County is
tied with Florida for the second highest number of executions behind Texas. See id.; see
alsoJack Douglas Jr. & Jeff Claassen, Few Whites Executed for Black Deaths, Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, Feb. 26, 1999, at Al (noting that the death sentence imposed on John William
King for the Jasper dragging murder marks the first time in the twenty-two years since
Texas resumed capital punishment that a white has received a death sentence for killing a
black in Texas).
123. United States General Accounting Office, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates
Pattern of Racial Disparities (Feb. 1990).
124. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (quoting Hirabayashi
v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)); see also Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 484 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (describing racial prejudice as "the paradigmatic capricious and
irrational sentencing factor").
125. For example, the popular election of appellate court judges who hear death pen-
alty cases on appeal and public prosecutors whose exercise of discretion determines
whether a case will be eligible for the death penalty raise concerns similar to those at-
tached to the popular election of trial court judges. Bright & Keenan, supra note 29, at
791-99; supra note 34. Also, the Court's death-qualifying process for capital juries has been
heavily criticized as skewing the fairness of the overall process. See supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (discussing the incompetence of de-
fense counsel); supra notes 102-114 and accompanying text (discussing the bias of trial
judges); supra notes 115-124 (discussing the effects of racial prejudice).
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hibited by a stroke of lightning 127 -that is to say, none or very little.
In fact, if I were an indigent black male in an Alabama courtroom,
where the trial judge retains the near unfettered right to override jury
recommendations for life, 2 ' and I was wrongly accused of killing a
white female, Tessie Hutchinson's random selection for death
129
would look mighty appealing.
IV. THE SEARCH FOR JUSTIFICATION
"They do say, "Mr. Adams said to Old Man Warner, who stood next
to him, "that over in the north village they're talking of giving up the
lottery."
Old Man Warner snorted. "Pack of crazy fools," he said. "Listen-
ing to the young folks, nothing's good enough for them. Next thing
you know, they'll be wanting to go back to living in caves, nobody
work any more, live that way for a while. Used to be a saying about
'Lottery in June, corn be heavy soon.' First thing you know, we'd all
be eating stewed chickweed and acorns. There's always been a lot-
tery," he added petulantly. "Bad enough to see young Joe Summers
up there joking with everybody. "130
At the time of the story's publication Ms. Jackson declined to of-
fer any explanation of its meaning.13 1 Over time, she provided a num-
ber of different accounts, to include that it was based on anti-
Semitism'12 and that it was meant "to shock the story's readers with a
graphic dramatization of the pointless violence and general inhuman-
ity in their own lives." 133 Within the story itself, the only hints of an
127. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (per curium) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) ("These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual.").
128. See supra note 107 (citing jurisdictions where a judge may override a jury's recom-
mendation for life).
129. Even though over three hundred people resided in Hutchinson's village, the true
odds that Tessie Hutchinson faced are unknown because the first drawing was done by
heads of households and we do not know how many families there were in the village. See
Richard H. Williams, A Critique of the Sampling Plan Used in Shirley Jackson's "The Lottery, "7 J.
MOD. LITERATURE 543, 544 (1979).
130. Jackson, supra note 1, at 394.
131. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 64 (explaining that when Harold Ross, the editor of The
New Yorker at the time of the original publication of The Lottery, "asked if [Ms. Jackson]
would care to enlarge upon its meaning, she refused").
132. See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 2, at 70-72, 81, 131 (noting that Ms. Jackson possessed
a "painful awareness of anti-Semitism [that] she had acquired over the years" as a result of
her marriage to a Jewish man).
133. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 64; see also OPPENHEIMER, supra note 2, at 130 (noting
that other readers suggested that The Lottery was a communist plot or that the story was
simply devoid of any point); Oehlschlaeger, supra note 68, at 264 (analyzing the story as a
fulfillment of patriarchal purposes as the women villagers surrender control to the men).
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explanation for the killing are provided by Old Man Warner, who has
lived through seventy-seven village lotteries, when he says, "Lottery in
June, corn be heavy soon[,]" and, "There's always been a lottery."'13 4
The first explanation sounds in some undisclosed pagan tradition,1 35
while the second sounds in the not uncommon practice of holding
onto the old way of doing things just because that is the way it has
always been done.1 36 Neither of these justifications offer much sup-
port for the stoning of Tessie Hutchinson, just as neither of the justifi-
cations put forward for our American system of capital punishment
offer much support for the state sponsored execution of our fellow
citizens.
The effort to justify the death penalty in America has focused on
the purposes of deterrence and retribution.3 7 Early in the search for
justification, the claim that the death penalty was needed for incapaci-
tation was largely set aside in light of the fact that life in prison could
accomplish this same goal in the vast majority of the cases. 131 Instead,
the justification controversy has settled on pitting the retentionists'
claim that the death penalty deters others from committing murder
against the abolitionists' assertions that the death penalty has no net
effect on murder rates or, worse yet, actually encourages others to
kill;139 and pitting the retentionists' contention that the death penalty
134. Jackson, supra note 1, at 394.
135. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 63 (describing past ritual sacrifices conducted to
appease a supernatural being such as "sacrifices in the name of a god of vegetation").
136. See Stark, supra note 51, at 358-59 ("[The lottery] has persisted for so long that it
has acquired a momentum of its own, which encourages its adherents to maintain it for
itself, quite aside from its consequences.").
137. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion).
138. SeeFurman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300-01 (1972) (Brennan,J., concurring) ("[I]f
a criminal convicted of a capital crime poses a danger to society, effective administration of
the State's pardon and parole laws can delay or deny his release from prison, and tech-
niques of isolation can eliminate or minimize the danger while he remains confined."); see
also MARK TUSHNET, THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (1994) ("A second reason for punishment, inca-
pacitation-preventing each criminal from continuing to commit crime-is almost as irrel-
evant" as rehabilitation in the death penalty debate.); Donald L. Beschle, What's Guilt (or
Deterrence) Got To Do With It?: The Death Penalty, Ritual, and Mimetic Violence, 38 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 487, 502 (1997) (noting that the incapacitation rationale "does not seem promi-
nently advanced in either scholarly or popular debate. Life imprisonment effectively
achieves incapacitation nearly as well as does death").
139. Some abolitionists assert that by carrying out intentional, premeditated executions,
the state sends the message that violence, to include killing, is an appropriate way to ad-
dress one's problems. SeeJohn Kaplan, The Problem of Capital Punishment, 1983 U. ILL. L.
REv. 555, 561 (contending that capital punishment may send the message to the general
public that "an appropriate method of settling a dispute is for one of the parties to kill the
other"). Another argument is that the availability of the death penalty encourages some to
seek suicide by state execution. See id. at 560 (discussing how a young woman in California
killed two children in the hope that the state would put her to death because she wanted to
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is required to satisfy society's need to exact retribution from those
who kill against the abolitionists' argument that retribution is an un-
worthy goal of a civilized society.
The debate over the impact of deterrence in our capital punish-
ment system is best taken up on two different levels. The first level is
characterized by struggles between various research efforts, while the
second is characterized by a struggle to prevail on what the true intui-
tion is regarding capital punishment and deterrence.
Even though there have been research efforts that have claimed a
significant deterrent effect from capital punishment, 4 ' the weight of
the considered opinion holds that the death penalty offers no statisti-
cally significant deterrent benefit beyond that offered by long-term
confinement. 4' This is not to say that the abolitionists have proven
their oft made claim that capital punishment actually encourages the
incidence of homicide, as that assertion remains open to debate.' 42
However, it is to say that over time the body of research has arrived at
die, but she didn't want to violate her religious proscriptions against suicide); Trisha
Renaud, Killer Asks Jurors, "Why Take the Risk?" of Letting Him Live, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REPORT, Oct. 7, 1998 (explaining that a capital defendant "insist[ed] he killed a middle-
aged ... couple specifically to get the electric chair because he could not kill himself').
140. See, e.g., Issac Ehrlich, The Deterrent-Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65 Am. ECON. REV. 397, 398 (1975) (estimating that each execution between 1933
and 1969 prevented eight homicides). Ehrlich's estimates have been heavily criticized on
many different grounds. See Gordon P. Waldo, The Death Penalty and Deterrence: A Review of
Recent Research, in THE MAD, THE BAD, AND THE DIFFERENT 169, at 172-76 (Israel L. Barak-
Glantz & C. Ronald Huff eds., 1981) (discussing Ehrlich's critics); Brian Forst, Capital Pun-
ishment and Deterrence: Conflicting Evidence?, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 927, 1939 (1983)
(suggesting that Ehrlich's predisposed belief in the value of the death penalty might have
affected his research); Richard 0. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral
Bases of The Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 1177, 1210-15 (1981) (citing tech-
nical and empirical problems with Ehrlich's sampling poll).
141. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 353 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Despite the fact that aboli-
tionists have not proved non-deterrence beyond a reasonable doubt, they have succeeded
in showing by clear and convincing evidence that capital punishment is not necessary as a
deterrent to crime in our society. This is all that they must do."); Beschle, supra note 138,
at 503 ("[T] he general consensus among social scientists is that the deterrent effect of the
death penalty is unproven."); Lempert, supra note 140, at 1224 ("There is little reason to
believe that the availability of capital punishment is-except possibly in certain rare cir-
cumstances-a substantial marginal deterrent."); Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers,
Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 2-5
(1996) (reviewing empirical research on the deterrent effect of the death penalty and con-
cluding that "the death penalty has virtually the same effect as long-term imprisonment on
homicide rates").
142. See Lempert, supra note 140, at 1216-17 (referring to empirical studies attempting
to establish a link between executions and homicides as "admirable first step [s]"); Radelet
& Akers, supra note 141, at 10 (arguing that "[tjhe brutalization hypothesis ... has not
been tested very well" and that "the research supporting it remains more suggestive than
definitive").
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a point where it can be said with relative certainty that capital punish-
ment advocates have failed to prove that the death penalty deters
more homicides than the readily available option of long-term
confinement. 143
Notwithstanding that the research rests at the point of denying a
relative deterrent effect from capital punishment, this has not ended
the debate in all circles. Instead, it has simply shifted the argument
from one of research results to one of intuition, with the death pen-
alty proponents claiming that there are obviously some individuals out
there who are contemplating killing another who will decide not to do
so because if they are caught and convicted they may very well be exe-
cuted.' 44 The abolitionists respond by reminding the proponents that
this intuition thus far suffers from a severe lack of proof,'45 and by
pointing out its implausibility. Specifically, the abolitionists say this
intuition is unbelievable because it would apply only to a type of per-
son who thinks rationally and who would commit a capital crime
knowing that the punishment is long-term imprisonment, but who
would not commit the crime knowing that the punishment is death.' 46
Nevertheless, capital punishment supporters argue that their intuition
draws its power from a common human experience which says that
death must be a more effective deterrent than any less severe pen-
alty.'47 Therefore, they maintain that since they are weighing the in-
143. See supra note 141. Professor Lempert believes this position has been proven to a
"moral certainty." See Lempert supra note 140, at 1222.
144. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185 (1976) (plurality opinion) (explaining that,
for some "the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent"). The Gregg plurality
offered the example of "carefully contemplated murders, such as murder for hire, where
the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the deci-
sion to act." Id. at 186; see also Beschle, supra note 138, at 502 (recognizing that the deter-
rence justification is "intuitively appealing" to many and thus "continues to draw wide
support" (footnote omitted)); Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, 18 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 957, 966 (1985) ("Whatever people fear most[-such as death-]is likely to
deter most. Hence, I believe that the threat of the death penalty may deter some murders
who otherwise might not have been deterred.").
145. See supra note 141.
146. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring) (rejecting the assumption
that a rational thinking person who would commit a capital crime exists); see also Black,
supra note 83, at 302 ("[A] mind so far gone down a strange and wild path [as to premedi-
tate murder] would probably not be swayed by the difference between possible (though
highly improbable) execution and possible (and much more probable) long imprison-
ment."); Lempert, supra note 140, at 1193 (noting that since "[miany homicides occur
when the offender is highly emotional or under the influence of alcohol" the odds of the
offender comparing different forms of punishment is slim).
147. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The States argue ... that
they are entitled to rely upon common human experience and that experience, they say,
supports the conclusion that death must be a more effective deterrent than any less severe
punishment.").
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nocent lives of potential victims against the guilty lives of murderers, it
is not their burden to prove that capital punishment deters homi-
cides; rather, it is the burden of the abolitionists to prove conclusively
the lack of a deterrent effect,14 and this is something the retentionists
say has not been accomplished.
The retentionists' intuition based, burden-shifting characteriza-
tion of the deterrence debate is not only an effort to force the aboli-
tionists to prove a negative, 14 but, more importantly, it is a giant step
removed from a true inquiry into whether the death penalty is justi-
fied. If we are searching for affirmative proof that the death penalty
accomplishes an accepted purpose of criminal punishment, the
record on deterrence is lacking to the point of nonexistence.1 5 0
While the proponents' "common human experience" intuition argu-
ment may have more to recommend it than Old Man Warner's proph-
ecy of "Lottery in June, corn be heavy soon," '151 it's not hard to draw a
comparison between that position and the old man's statement that
the village should continue to stone one of its inhabitants to death
each year because it has always stoned one of its inhabitants to death
each year.1
52
When the Supreme Court welcomed capital punishment back in
1976, it said of retribution, while it "'is no longer the dominant objec-
148. See Kaplan, supra note 139, at 559 (discussing the argument that the burden of
proof should lie on the abolitionists because "we should make our errors in favor of inno-
cent lives rather than in favor of guilty ones"); see also Beschle, supra note 138, at 503 ("One
response to this situation might be to argue that the burden is not on the defenders of a
historically common punishment to prove its efficacy, but rather upon its opponents to
prove the opposite. Because that probably cannot be done, given the inability to set up a
valid controlled experiment, history and intuition should prevail."); Bigel, supra note 76, at
44 ("Instead of seeking to measure deterrence from a national, interstate or intrastate
perspective, retentionists have argued that, even if only a few randomly convicted felons
concede that they refrained from committing murder to avoid the death penalty, the de-
terrent effect of capital punishment has been fulfilled."); cf MARK TUSHNET, THE DEATH
PENALTY 9 (1994) ("The murder victim, killed because there is no death penalty, is entirely
innocent; the executed murderer, killed because of the perhaps false belief that the death
penalty deters, is not. That is a reason to say that, if we are uncertain about the death
penalty's deterrent effect, we ought not to abolish it.").
149. Cf Beschle, supra note 138, at 531 ("[O]nce the burden of proof is placed upon
opponents of capital punishment, and set at a level that demands a great deal of certainty,
the deterrence debate becomes futile."). Beschle contended that such a burden "will
never be possible to disprove .. .with sufficient certainty." Id.
150. See supra note 141 (noting the lack of evidence in support of the deterrence
justification).
151. Jackson, supra note 1, at 394.
152. Cf O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the
Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897) ("It is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time
of Henry IV.").
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tive of the criminal law,' . . . neither is it a forbidden objective nor one
inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men."' 53 The Court
said that capital punishment for murder would serve as "an expression
of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct, '154 thus
encouraging its citizens "to rely on legal processes rather than self-
help to vindicate their wrongs."'155 As the Court has returned to the
issue over the years, it has affirmed the death penalty's outrage expres-
sing function, 56 and it has embraced a 'Just deserts" 57 conception of
retribution by speaking of the need to allow for a sentence that is
"directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal of-
fender." 5 ' These same themes have been echoed by supporters of
capital punishment, who have called for the sanction because it satis-
fies society's insistence on adequate punishment for outrageous
crimes, 15 9 and because it achieves justice by exacting a punishment
that is proportional to the crime of murder 6 ° or enables society to
pay murderers back for the harm they have caused. 6 '
As one might expect, the abolitionist attack on retribution on the
Supreme Court was championed by Justices Marshall and Brennan.
153. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)).
154. Id. (footnote omitted).
155. Id. The idea that capital punishment will prevent vigilantism sounds not in retribu-
tion theory, but in utilitarianism, since it anticipates some future beneficial results to spin-
off from the use of the sanction. See id. at 237-38 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (per curiam) (Stewart, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Marshall scorned this defense of the death penalty, saying, "[i]t simply defies belief to
suggest that the death penalty is necessary to prevent the American people from taking the
law into their own hands." Id. at 238.
156. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836-38 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(holding that despite society's moral outrage, the death penalty could not be imposed on
murderers who were younger than sixteen years of age at the time of their offense due to
their lesser culpability).
157. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1981) (rejecting the application of
the death penalty because the particular facts did not support a finding that capital punish-
ment would ensure "that the criminal gets his just deserts").
158. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987). The Court called this need for culpabil-
ity "[t]he heart of the retribution rationale." Id.
159. See KRONENWETTER, supra note 71, at 6 (citing Lord Justice Denning, Master of the
Rolls of the Court of Appeals in England, as stating that "some crimes are so outrageous
that society insists on adequate punishment because the wrongdoer deserves it" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
160. See id. at 5 (citing Professor Ernest van Jen Haag as stating that "we feel a man who
has committed a crime must be punished in proportion to the seriousness of the crime"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
161. SeeWalter Berns, The Morality of Anger, in PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY 152
(Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1995) (explaining the different viewpoints
as to the purpose of capital punishment).
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In Furman v. Georgia,'62 both Justices challenged the basic legitimacy
of retribution as a justifying principle for the death penalty. Justice
Marshall wrote that "[r]etaliation, vengeance, and retribution have
been roundly condemned as intolerable aspirations for a government
in a free society,"' 63 and he claimed that the Court had "consistently
denigrated retribution as a permissible goal of punishment." '64 In
that same case, Justice Brennan characterized retribution as the belief
that "criminals are put to death because they deserve it," '65 and he
scoffed at the idea that any state would "wish [ ] to proclaim adher-
ence to 'naked vengeance."'166 In direct response to the argument
that capital punishment was necessary to express society's abhorrence
of certain crimes, Justice Marshall said, in Furman, that the Eighth
Amendment was there to provide "insulation from our baser
selves." '167 Four years later in Gregg v. Georgia,6 ' Justice Marshall re-
turned to this same theme and again rejected the retributive justifica-
tion because, in his opinion, the death penalty conflicts with the basic
concept of human dignity at the core of the Eighth Amendment by
entailing a "total denial of the wrongdoer's dignity and worth." '69
Other opponents of capital punishment have also responded in
the retribution debate around the same two themes of expressing soci-
etal outrage and exacting just deserts on offenders. Like Justices
Marshall and Brennan, abolitionists have argued that societal outrage
is either the same as, or not far from, societal vengeance, and ven-
geance is not an emotion or desire that should be indulged by the
state. 170 Furthermore, if capital punishment is employed as a means
162. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
163. Id. at 343 (Marshall, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 344.
165. Id. at 304 (Brennan, J., concurring).
166. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 112 (1958) (plurality opinion) (Brennan,
J., concurring)).
167. Id. at 345 (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall explained that but for this insula-
tion, "the rack and other tortures would be possible in a given case." Id.
168. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
169. Id. at 241 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. See TUSHNET, supra note 148, at 4 (noting that societal vengeance once expressed
may become uncontrollable, causing the execution of innocents); Black, supra note 83, at
304 (supporting the notion that although there is intense support among the people for
retribution or vengeance, these desires are misplaced, as their fulfillment will not return
the victim to his family); see also Reverend Bernice A. King, Uprooting the Seeds of Violence,
THE OTHER SIDE, Sept.-Dec. 1997, at 36. King stated:
Those who thirst for revenge may experience the illusion of satisfaction, but this
never lasts long in people of conscience, because every act of violence leaves in its
wake the seeds of more violence. We don't redeem the loss of our loved ones by
adding to the misery of our society and the callousness of our government. In the
short term, the death penalty may satisfy the very human impulse to seek revenge.
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of expressing society's collective anger, that practice could "too easily
get out of hand" and result in "the death penalty [being] imposed on
people who-even on the society's own retributivist terms-do not de-
serve it."'' Finally, since a significant number of the condemned ex-
perience positive change in their personal character and respect for
humanity during the years they linger on death row, 1 7 2 by the time
executions roll around whatever societal outrage remains is often di-
rected at persons who are remarkably different from who they were
when they committed their crimes. 73
As for the just deserts conception of retribution, abolitionists
have argued that whatever appeal this claim might have in a world
with a just system of capital punishment, that appeal quickly fades in
the context of how the death penalty is carried out in America.' It is
a fact that our system of capital punishment generates unprincipled
death sentences based upon such things as the incompetence of coun-
sel, the bias of the judiciary, the influence of race, 175 and the mistaken
allocation of responsibility, to include the wrongful conviction of the
innocent and the insane.i 76 This, in turn, presents an insurmounta-
ble barrier to a legitimate and complete just deserts argument in sup-
In the long run, however, compounding acts of brutality add to the suffering of
the loved ones of offenders and victims alike.
Id. (available on-line at <http://www.theotherside.org/archive/sep-dec97/king.html>).
171. TUSHNET, supra note 148, at 4.
172. See Lempert, supra note 140, at 1184 (explaining that a death row experience may
bring about a "change in moral identity" thereby raising the question of whether the in-
mate still deserves to die); see also Ward & Rodriguez, supra note 61, at Al (describing Karla
Faye Tucker's religious transformation while she awaited execution on the Texas death
row).
173. See Lou Jones & Lorie Savel, Portraits from Death Row: Final Exposure, THE OTHER
SIDE, Sept.-Dec. 1997, at 8, 11 (explaining that one of the tragedies of capital punishment
is "that they almost never execute the same man they convict" because "[e]veryone
changes in time" and "[d]eath row escalates that change whether for good or bad, because
you spend so much time alone").
174. See Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment, 99 -ARv. L.
REv. 1670, 1677 (1986) (explaining that "the moral force of any retribution argument is
radically undercut by the hard facts of the actual American system of capital punishment,"
a system that "violates fundamental norms because it is haphazard, and because it is region-
ally and racially biased").
175. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (noting the incompetency of many
defense counsels); supra notes 102-114 and accompanying text (noting the biases of the
judiciary); supra notes 115-124 and accompanying text (noting the greater likelihood of
minority defendants receiving a death sentence than their white counterparts).
176. SeeCallins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145-46 (1994) (denial of cert.) (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting) (conceding that "no combination of procedural rules or substantive regula-
tions ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies," and
that the current system "must wrongly kill some defendants"); see also supra notes 72-88 and
accompanying text (noting the incidence of mistaken convictions and the likelihood that
the innocent will be executed).
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port of capital punishment."' Since just deserts depends upon the
punishment being absolutely and truly deserved, it cannot possibly
support "a policy that trades the wrongful execution of a few for the
proper execution of many."'' 7
8
Since the retribution debate is largely an argument over moral-
ity, l79 it is tempting to say that both sides should be respected and no
further discussion is necessary. This, however, cannot be done due to
the imperfections in our system of capital punishment. The flaws in
the way that our death penalty is administered present a direct chal-
lenge to the just deserts retributive rational.' Additionally, these
same infirmities significantly detract from the strength of the societal
outrage claim, in that we should hardly welcome the sacrifice of unde-
serving souls simply to satisfy the blood lust of the populace. There-
fore, it is extremely problematic to base state-sponsored executions on
retributive theories in the face of the available alternatives of life in
prison, with or without parole. Respect for conflicting views may de-
mand that I not correlate the retentionists' retribution claims with
Old Man Warner's pagan chant or blind adherence to tradition, but
that respect does not warrant continued support for the American sys-
tem of capital punishment. Given the state of the evidence regarding
deterrence and the infirmities of the retentionists' retribution claims,
the inescapable conclusion is that we do not have a rational reason for
continuing to send men, women, and children to their deaths in exe-
cution chambers across the country.' 8 1
177. See David J. Gottlieb, The Death Penalty in the Legislature: Some Thoughts About Money,
Myth, and Morality, 37 U. KAN. L. REv. 443, 457 (1989) (explaining that "[t]he moral force
of capital punishment is undercut by the realities of executions," and the "system violates
notions ofjust punishment because it is haphazardly administered against a small, almost
randomly selected sample of eligible persons").
178. Lempert, supra note 140, at 1184.
179. See Lempert, supra note 140, at 1183 (reporting that modem retributivists "respect
the law's determination that capital punishment should be reserved for the most morally
culpable").
180. See Greenberg, supra note 174, at 1670 (finding that the death penalty has been
administered inconsistently and is thus incompatible with its proponents' stated objec-
tives). See generally supra notes 72-88, 102-124 and accompanying text (discussing the fail-
ings in the administration of the death penalty in America, including race factors, politics,
mental incapacity, and mistake).
181. It has been suggested that capital punishment survives and prospers not because it
is considered a rational policy choice, but because it "serves an important ritual or mythical
function" by informing the public that "opinion leaders are concerned with the feelings of
victims rather than the perpetrators; it affirms that society is doing something . . .about
violent crime." Gottlieb, supra note 177, at 458-59; see also Beschle, supra note 138, at 518
("To hypothesize that the primary reason behind the death penalty is its function as a
symbolic sacrifice .. .permits one to explain a number of features of the contemporary
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V. THE BRUTALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY
Although the villagers had forgotten the ritual and lost the original
black box, they still remembered to use stones. The pile of stones the
boys had made earlier was ready; there were stones on the ground
with the blowing scraps of paper that had come out of the box. Dela-
croix selected a stone so large she had to pick it up with both hands
and turned to Mrs. Dunbar. "Come on," she said. "Hurry up."
Mrs. Dunbar had small stones in both hands, and she said, gasping
for breath, "I can't run at all. You'll have to go ahead and I'll catch
up with you."
The children had stones already. And someone gave little Davy
Hutchinson a few pebbles.'82
It is just after Davy is given a few pebbles that the full village falls
upon Tessie Hutchinson and stones her to death."' 3 The mental pic-
ture spawned by this ending is brutal in a very basic way. There is
blood. There is a palatable sense of pain. There is an overwhelming
force against which physical resistance is futile. There is absolute
hopelessness. Tessie Hutchinson is going to die a violent death at. the
hands of the stone wielding mob and there is nothing that she can do
about it.
The unvarnished picture of our American system of capital pun-
ishment can also be said to be characterized by blood, pain, futile re-
sistance, and hopelessness. While it is true that lethal injection does
not necessarily entail the letting of blood from the body, our other
methods of putting the condemned to death most certainly do. It
does not take much imagination to draw parallels between killing
someone by hanging,"8 4 shooting,1 85 gassing,"' or electrocution 187
and stoning. All either necessarily present us with a bloody and
death penalty that simply are not consistent with the rationalist theories that either deter-
rence or retribution serve as its basis.").
182. Jackson, supra note 1, at 397.
183. See id.
184. Delaware, New Hampshire, and Washington allow for the possibility that a con-
demned inmate will be executed by hanging instead of lethal injection. See DEATH PENALTY
INFORMtATION CENTER, Methods of Execution by State (visited Feb. 18, 2000) <http://
www.essential.ord/dpic/methods.html>.
185. Idaho, Oklahoma, and Utah allow for the possibility that a condemned inmate will
be executed by a firing squad instead of by lethal injection. See id.
186. Five states allow for the possibility that a condemned inmate will be executed in the
gas chamber instead of by lethal injection. See id..
187. Eleven states use the electric chair as either their sole means of execution or as one
of their potential alternatives. See id.
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marred corpse, or allow for ample possibility of the same. 8 s Addition-
ally, all of these methods can result in pain being inflicted upon the
condemned, and this includes lethal injection. It is well-documented
that some inmates die an excruciatingly slow death because an im-
proper dose of drugs allows them to awaken paralyzed and unable to
breathe.' 89
Like Tessie Hutchinson, the condemned on America's death
rows are faced with a force against which physical resistance is futile.
Once an inmate has landed on death row, the strictness of the security
all but eliminates the possibility of escape,1 9° and that last walk to the
execution chamber does not allow for any dramatic dash for free-
dom.' 91 Furthermore, when an inmate has reached this point, his sit-
uation is certainly as hopeless as was Tessie Hutchinson's when she
pleaded that her selection wasn't fair or right. Taking the "dead
man's walk"' 92 and then being strapped down in the execution cham-
ber ensure that the absolute finality and inevitability of death is fully
appreciated. All hope of life evaporates as the inmate realizes that in
a moment he will die-in a moment the State will take his life. 193
In addition to the basic brutality194 that pervades both The Lottery
and our system of capital punishment, there are other more refined
brutal parallels that can be drawn between Ms. Jackson's fiction and
our real lives. The first of these, as previously discussed, is that in
Tessie Hutchinson's village and in America there is a willingness to
188. See, e.g., Michales, supra note 52, at 143-44 (providing some eyewitness accounts of
executions by electrocution and hanging).
189. See supra note 26 (discussing examples of botched executions).
190. See MARQUART ET AL., supra note 22, at 13841 (describing the security measures that
are a part of life on death row).
191. SeegenerallyJoHNSON, supra note 17, at 142-66 (explaining that the emphasis during
the final hours approaching an inmate's execution is on social control, rather than physi-
cal control, because "modern execution etiquette" requires that a prisoner walk unbound
to his death); MARQuART ET AL., supra note 22, at 236-38 (describing Texas security proce-
dures attendant to the final day of the execution process).
192. HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING (1993).
193. SeeJOHNSON, supra note 17, at 175 ("At the end, resistance of any kind seemed
unthinkable. Like so many of those before him.... [the inmate] appeared to have given
upon life before he died in the chair.").
194. The use of various forms of the word "brutal" herein should not be taken to be
synonymous with the long debated question of whether the death penalty has a brutalizing
effect on society. This idea asserts that state executions lower respect for life rather than
sustaining respect for life; hence, capital punishment may stimulate rather than deter mur-
der. See John K. Cochran et al., Deterrence or Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of
Oklahoma's Return to Capital Punishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 107, 108 (1994) (discussing a re-
search study that suggests that highly publicized executions actually brutalize society by
legitimating lethal violence, leading to unintended increases in the level of criminal homi-
cide). I do not intend to implicate this issue in this section of the Article.
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sacrifice the innocent 9 5 upon the respective alters of the lottery and
the death penalty. Beyond this, two other parallels are that neither
world is put off by the brutality of executing children or the mentally
retarded.
After Bill Hutchinson draws the lot that isolates the selection pro-
cess on his family, each of the Hutchinsons is then required to take his
or her chance in the lottery. This includes all three of the
Hutchinson children who are still at home; Bill Jr., Nancy, and little
Davy.19 6 The reader is told that Nancy is twelve, and although Ms.
Jackson never gives the specific ages of the two boys, there are plenty
of hints in the story to enable a reader to guess their approximate
ages. BillJr.'s "overlarge feet" and order in the lottery mark him as an
adolescent, while little Davy's inability to reach into the box and draw
out a lot on his own tells us that he is the youngest in the family.'9 7
We, therefore, have a boy who is in his middle teens, a girl of twelve,
and a boy who is certainly less than ten, and all three had an equal
chance of being stoned to death in place of their mother.
As shocking as the potential killing of the Hutchinson children
may seem in Ms. Jackson's work of fiction, the reality of the American
system of capital punishment is that we sentence children to death
and execute them, all in the name ofjustice.1 98 In 1988, in Thompson
v. Oklahoma,'99 the Supreme Court held that offenders who were
younger than sixteen at the time of their crimes were not constitution-
ally eligible for the death penalty.20 However, just one year later, in
Stanford v. Kentucky,2"' the Court, in a five to four vote, refused to ex-
tend that same immunity to children aged sixteen and seventeen.20 2
Accordingly, while we would not execute Nancy or Davy, it is entirely
possible that Bill Jr., would qualify for our death penalty. This may
195. See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
196. Jackson, supra note 1, at 396-97.
197. Cf Oehlschlaeger, supra note 68, at 263.
198. Seventy individuals, all male, currently sit on death row as a result of sentences they
received as juveniles. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENrER, Juveniles and the Death Penalty
(visited Feb. 18, 2000) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/juvchar.html>. Since 1976, thir-
teen males have been executed for crimes they committed as juveniles. See id.
199. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
200. Id. at 838 ("[W]e are not persuaded that the imposition of the death penalty for
offenses committed by persons under 16 years of age has made ... any measurable contri-
bution to the goals that capital punishment is intended to achieve. It is... thus an uncon-
stitutional punishment." (internal citations omitted)).
201. 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality opinion).
202. Id. at 380. By so holding, the Court rejected the dissenting argument that
'Juveniles as a class have not the level of maturation and responsibility that we presume in
adults and consider desirable for full participation in the rights and duties of modern life."
Id. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tempt us to pat ourselves on the back while proclaiming that two out
of three is not bad, but this would be false pride in light of the fact
that our willingness to execute someone similar to Bill Jr., puts us in
the elite company of countries like Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Ara-
bia, and Yemen.2" 3
In the course of The Lottery, the reader is told that the village con-
tains "about three hundred people."2 4 In light of this, although Ms.
Jackson's never writes as much, if the village's demographics are re-
flective of the rest of the United States, it is fair to assume that it would
have at least three mentally retarded individuals amongst its mem-
bers.21 5 Therefore, given that there is no indication that these mem-
bers of the village are exempt from the lottery, it can be said that this
is yet another brutal parallel that is shared between Ms. Jackson's com-
munity and our own system of capital punishment.
In the 1989 case of Penry v. Lynaugh,2 °6 the Supreme Court re-
fused to allow the mentally retarded to be excluded from the applica-
tion of the death penalty.2 7 Notwithstanding that the condemned
man in that particular case had an IQ of between fifty and sixty-
three,2 0 8 and a mental age of 61/2,209 the Court held that the peti-
tioner, and all others like him, could constitutionally be put to death
for the worst of their crimes.210 As a consequence of this decision,
death rows around the country include hundreds of inmates who are
203. See Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty (last modified Dec.
18, 1999) <http://www.amnesty. org/ailib/intcam/dp/dpfacts.htm>. Of these six coun-
tries, the U.S. has committed the most executions since 1990 of child offenders. See id.
204. Jackson, supra note 1, at 390.
205. SeeJAsKuLssu ET AL., PRESIDE'r'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE JOUR-
NEY TO INCLUSION 26 (1996) (citing a national prevalence rate for mental retardation of
one percent).
206. 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (plurality opinion).
207. See id. at 340 (concluding that the Eighth Amendment does not preclude execution
solely on the basis of mental retardation because sentencers can take into consideration in
their sentencing the mitigating effects of mental retardation).
208. See id. at 307-08 (explaining that the defendant's impairment qualified as mild to
moderate mental retardation).
209. See id. at 308 (noting that Penry, who was 22 years old when he committed his
crime, had a social age of nine or ten).
210. See id. at 340. Justice O'Connor explained:
[W]e cannot conclude today that the Eighth Amendment precludes the execu-
tion of any mentally retarded person of Penry's ability convicted of a capital of-
fense simply by virtue of his or her mental retardation alone.... While a national
consensus against execution of the mentally retarded may someday emerge re-
flecting the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,' there is insufficient evidence of such a consensus today.
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mentally retarded, 21 1 and they are constantly being put to death,212
despite their inability to understand fully their crime, its conse-
quences, or the reality of the State taking their lives. On this last
point, the record is replete with stories about how mentally retarded
defendants have been led to their deaths even while they display a lack
of comprehension of what was happening to them.2 3  Tessie
Hutchinson might have thought her being stoned to death was unfair
and not right, but at least she was able to understand what was hap-
pening to her and voice her protests. Many of the mentally retarded
inmates who are executed across America are denied even that recog-
nition of their humanity.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately one finds that the ritual of the lottery, beyond providing a
channel to release repressed cruelties, actually serves to generate a
cruelty not rooted in man's inherent emotional needs at all. Man is
not at the mercy of a murky, savage id; he is the victim of unexam-
ined and unchanging traditions which he could easily change if he
only realized their implications. Herein is horror.214
211. See NATIONAL COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, Mental Competency and the
Death Penalty (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.ncadp.org/facts.html> (estimating that
more than 300 people on death row suffer from mental retardation). But see Victor L.
Streib, Executing Women, Children, and the Retarded: Second Class Citizens, in AMErUCA'S EXPERJ-
MENT ITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 211-12 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998) (discussing the
lack of reliable and conclusive statistics on the number of mentally retarded serving on
death row).
212. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty
(visited Feb. 18., 2000) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpicmr.html> (stating that 34 in-
dividuals with mental retardation have been executed).
213. SeeJOHNSON, supra note 17, at 5 (explaining that mentally retarded offenders often
do not understand the concept of death); NATIONAL COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH
PENALTY, supra note 211 (reporting that Morris Odell Mason, who was mentally retarded,
made the following statement to another inmate while walking to the execution chamber:
"When I get back, I'm gonna show him how I can play basketball as good as he can."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Crime & Punishment: An Execution in Texas (ABC
Nightline television broadcast, Jan. 17, 1995) (recounting a discussion between attorney
Robert McClassen and his mentally retarded client, Mario Marquez, where Marquez stated
his hope that after his execution he would go to heaven where he could work either as a
gardener or in a position that takes care of animals). Cf Rick Bragg, A Killer Racked by
Delusions Dies in Alabama's Electric Chair, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1995, at A7 (reporting on the
execution of Varnall Weeks, "a convicted killer described by psychiatric experts as a para-
noid schizophrenic who believed he would come back to life as a giant flying tortoise that
would rule the world"); SOUTHERN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Capital Punishment on the
25th Anniversary of Furman v. Georgia 28 (June 26, 1997) <http://www.schr.org/reports/
docs/furman3.pdf> ("When . . . [Jerome Bowden] received a last minute stay from an
execution, he asked his lawyer if that meant he could watch a television program that
night.").
214. Nebeker, supra note 8, at 102.
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One of the real ironies of Ms. Jackson's effort is that by stoning
Tessie Hutchinson to death she assures herself of immortality. Given
the ability of her story to resonate with readers years after its publica-
tion, there is every reason to believe that ShirelyJackson will live on,
as each new generation discovers the horror that awaits Mrs.
Hutchinson at the end of The Lottery. Recognition of this lasting fasci-
nation, however, does not tell us what drives it in the first place. Is it
that we wish for a similar event in our own lives to release our re-
pressed cruelties? Is it that the thought of a isolated village's tradition
of an annual stoning holds some anthropological interest for us? Or
is it that we cannot help but afford ourselves a peak into ShirelyJack-
son's village just as we cannot help but look at a terrible car crash
when we pass one on the highway?
Similarly, do one or more or all of these explanations tell us why
we continue to be fascinated with capital punishment? Whatever the
explanation, what is clear is that we do not need it, and we have, over
a long period of time, proven ourselves totally incapable of adminis-
tering it fairly-if indeed that is even possible. Therefore, it is hard to
avoid the conclusion that our love of the death penalty springs from
an infirmity similar to that which one commentator has subscribed to
Ms. Jackson's villagers: "their thinly veiled cruelty keeps the custom
alive. 215
215. Coulthard, supra note 64, at 226. Consider an alternative point of view and conse-
quent action:
In the midst of anxiety and fear, complexity and doubt, perhaps our greatest
need is reverence for life-mere life: our lives, the lives of others, all life. Life is
... an end in itself. A humane and generous concern for every individual, for his
safety, his health and his fulfillment, will do more to soothe the savage heart than
the fear of State-inflicted death which chiefly serves to remind us how close we
remain to the jungle.
To Abolish the Death Penalty: Hearings on S. 1760 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. (1968) (statement of Ramsey
Clark, U.S. Attorney General).
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